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Jerry Fodor
Protagonist
1
#2784
Arguments advanced by Jerry Fodor.
CONTEXT
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Artificial Intelligence »
Artificial Intelligence
Artificial IntelligenceâA collaboratively editable version of Robert Horns brilliant and pioneering debate map Can Computers Think?âexploring 50 years of philosophical argument about the possibility of computer thought.âF1CEB7
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Protagonists »
Protagonists
ProtagonistsâThe contributions of over 300 protagonists can be explored via a surname search, or using the growing list developing here.âD3B8AB
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Jerry Fodor
Jerry FodorâArguments advanced by Jerry Fodor.âD3B8AB
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Unconscious and conscious states aren't identical »
Unconscious and conscious states aren't identical
Unconscious and conscious states aren't identicalâSearle presupposes that any given unconscious state is identical to its conscious form. But identity is partly determined by causal powers, and the causal powers of an unconscious state are different from the causal powers of a conscious state.âFFFACD
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The consciousness-pill thought experiment »
The consciousness-pill thought experiment
The consciousness-pill thought experiment âThe connection principle isnt controversial, even in an extreme form. Its just an interesting possibilityâand because the possibility isnt controversial, theres nothing wrong with Searles account.âFFFACD
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Implementable in functional system »
Implementable in functional system
Implementable in functional systemâProperly organized functional states generate consciousness. Such organization exists in the brain and can be built into computers as well.âFFFACD
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Computationalism »
Computationalism
ComputationalismâComputationalism locates the mental in abstract computational states embedded in a complex network of inputs, outputs, and other mental states: machine-state functionalism locates it in the various possible machine states that could implement them. âFFFACD
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Brain-style modelling can be misleading »
Brain-style modelling can be misleading
Brain-style modelling can be misleading âBasing psychological theories on facts about the brain can be misleading. Neural inspiration seems useful, but its led to a revival of such weak psychological theories as: associationism; microfeature analysis; and  statistically based learning.âFFFACD
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Facts about the brain may be irrelevant »
Facts about the brain may be irrelevant
Facts about the brain may be irrelevantâStructures at different levels of organisation are often dissimilar. Thinking may have little in common with the neural structures its implemented in. Basing a theory of cognitive architecture on a theory about the brain requires care.âFFFACD
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The Connectionist Dilemma »
The Connectionist Dilemma
The Connectionist DilemmaâThe connectionist approach to cognitive science is impaled on the horns of a dilemma: it is either inadequate as a theory of mind, or else it is an implementation of the classical architecture (see detailed text).âFFFACD
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Connectionism is associationism »
Connectionism is associationism
Connectionism is associationismâProcessing units in a connectionist network are connected by associative links. Associationist theories cant account for systematicity and related phenomena: symbolic AI can via structured representations and structure sensitive thought processes.âFFFACD
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Constituents lack causal powers »
Constituents lack causal powers
Constituents lack causal powersâThe parts of a tensor product representation are not explicitly contained or tokened within itâthe parts have no independent status in the complex representation. As such, tensor product constituents lack individual causal powers.âFFFACD
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The Regress of Contexts »
The Regress of Contexts
The Regress of Contexts âSmolenskys coffee representation leads to an infinite regress of representations. Coffee depends on a higher order representation of cup-with-coffee. But cup-with-coffee presumably depends on another (eg cup-with-coffee-on-the table). And so on.âFFFACD
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Yes: physical symbol systems can think [3] »
Yes: physical symbol systems can think [3]
Yes: physical symbol systems can think [3]âThinking is a rule governed manipulation of symbolic representational structures. In humans, symbol systems are instantiated in the brain, but the same symbol systems can also be instantiated in a computer. âFFFACD
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Symbol structures can be distributed »
Symbol structures can be distributed
Symbol structures can be distributedâA classicial symbol processor can be physically distributed in memory, and can thereby exhibit graceful degradation. So distributed systems like connectionist networks dont have any principled advatange over physical symbol systems.âFFFACD
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The 100-step constraint »
The 100-step constraint
The 100-step constraintâAlogrithms modelling cognitive processes must meet the 100-step constraint for performing complex tasks imposed by the brains timescale. Classical sequential algorithms, which run in millions of time-steps now, seem unlikely to meet the constraint.âFFFACD
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Symbol processing can take place in parallel »
Symbol processing can take place in parallel
Symbol processing can take place in parallelâAÂ classical system can be implemented in a parallel architecture: eg by executing multiple symbolic processes at the same time. So parallel processing systems, like connectionist networks, have no principled advantage over classical symbol systems.âFFFACD
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The language of thought »
The language of thought
The language of thoughtâThe language of thoughts a formal language that mental processes operate on; with a combinatorial syntax and semantics. Sentences are generated from combinations of words: complex mental representations from combinations of simpler representations.âFFFACD
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Affordances are trivial »
Affordances are trivial
Affordances are trivialâAffordances are just another name for whatever it is in the environment that makes an organism respond as it does. But such a notion cant provide a substantial explanation of perception and adds nothing new to our knowledge of perception mechanismâFFFACD
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Classicists aren't committed to explicit rules »
Classicists aren't committed to explicit rules
Classicists aren't committed to explicit rulesâThe possibility of implicit rules doesnt argue against the classical symbolic framework, because theres a body of work within the classicist camp that shows how implicit rules can be modeled.âFFFACD
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Proper instantiations require the right causal connections »
Proper instantiations require the right causal connections
Proper instantiations require the right causal connectionsâThe definition of instantiation used in the Chinese Room argmument isnt sufficiently rich for the Chinese Room to be considered as an instantiation of a program. âFFFACD
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Causal connection to world is essential to meaning »
Causal connection to world is essential to meaning
Causal connection to world is essential to meaningâMental states become meaningfulâ intentional or semanticâthrough causal connecton via the senses to, and ability to act on, the external world. Searle doesnt show that no causal connection could ever produce meaning at all, just that his man cant.âFFFACD
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Turing Test only provides partial evidence »
Turing Test only provides partial evidence
Turing Test only provides partial evidenceâThe Turing Test only provides partial, inductive evidence of intelligence, and passing the test does not guarantee successful simulation of human behaviour. Moreover, any given Turing test provides only a finite sample of a test takers repertoire.âFFFACD
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Jerry Fodor »
Jerry Fodor
Jerry FodorâArguments advanced by Jerry Fodor.âFFFACD
◄
Jerry Fodor »
Jerry Fodor
Jerry FodorâArguments advanced by Jerry Fodor.âFFFACD
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Entered by:-
David Price
NodeID:
#2784
Node type:
Protagonist
Entry date (GMT):
7/20/2007 6:20:00 PM
Last edit date (GMT):
7/20/2007 6:20:00 PM
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