Lucas may be a Turing machine
If we fix up Lucas's argument so that it's more accurate, we discover that it proves something different than Lucas intended. It shows that: Lucas may be a Turing machine—and that, if he is, he has no way of knowing which one he is.
The corrected argument, it turns out, shows that:
  • Lucas may be a Turing machine. So Lucas's intended argument—that is not a machine—fails.
  • Furthermore, if Lucas is a Turing machine, he has no way of knowing which one he is.
Paul Benacerraf (1967).

Note: This argument Simeon stimulates a highly technical thread of debate that is not represented here because of its length and complexity.

The thread includes papers from Hanson (1971), Chahara (1972), and Reinhardt (1986).
CONTEXT(Help)
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Artificial Intelligence »Artificial Intelligence
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Are thinking computers mathematically possible? [7] »Are thinking computers mathematically possible? [7]
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No: computers are limited by Gödel's theorems »No: computers are limited by Gödel's theorems
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Lucas may be a Turing machine
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Benacerraf’s argument is inconsistent »Benacerraf’s argument is inconsistent
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Lucas sure that he isn't a machine »Lucas sure that he isn't a machine
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