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Understanding arises from right causal powers
SupportiveArgument
1
#792
Systems capable of semantic understanding and intentionality must have at least the same causal powers as brains. Brains have sufficient causal powers to produce understanding: it's an open empirical question whether other materials (eg silicon) do.
John Searle 1980a, 1980b, 1990b.
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Artificial Intelligence »
Artificial Intelligence
Artificial IntelligenceâA collaboratively editable version of Robert Horns brilliant and pioneering debate map Can Computers Think?âexploring 50 years of philosophical argument about the possibility of computer thought.âF1CEB7
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Can computers think? [1] »
Can computers think? [1]
Can computers think? [1]âCan a computational system possess all important elements of human thinking or understanding? âFFB597
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Yes: physical symbol systems can think [3] »
Yes: physical symbol systems can think [3]
Yes: physical symbol systems can think [3]âThinking is a rule governed manipulation of symbolic representational structures. In humans, symbol systems are instantiated in the brain, but the same symbol systems can also be instantiated in a computer. â59C6EF
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The Chinese Room Argument [4] »
The Chinese Room Argument [4]
The Chinese Room Argument [4]âInstantiation of a formal program isnt enough to produce semantic understanding or intentionality. A man who doesnt understand Chinese, can answer written Chinese questions using an English rulebook telling him how to manipulate Chinese symbols.âEF597B
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Understanding arises from right causal powers
Understanding arises from right causal powersâSystems capable of semantic understanding and intentionality must have at least the same causal powers as brains. Brains have sufficient causal powers to produce understanding: its an open empirical question whether other materials (eg silicon) do.â98CE71
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Biological Naturalism »
Biological Naturalism
Biological NaturalismâConsciousness and intentionality are caused by and realised in the brain. The brain has the right causal powers to produce intentionality.â98CE71
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Brain's causal powers reproduced by a computer »
Brain's causal powers reproduced by a computer
Brain's causal powers reproduced by a computerâA computational system that could duplicate the microlevel functional structure of the brain duplicates the brains causal powers. If the causal powers give rise to intentionalityâas Searle suggestsâthen such a system would possess intentionality.âEF597B
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Chinese Room style argument shows causal powers insufficient »
Chinese Room style argument shows causal powers insufficient
Chinese Room style argument shows causal powers insufficientâWe can replace a relevant causal power in a Chinese speakers brainâeg neurotransmittersâwith a demon that simulates the causal powers function without understanding Chinese; hence having the right causal powers isnt sufficient for understanding.âEF597B
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Programming may be necessary to understanding »
Programming may be necessary to understanding
Programming may be necessary to understandingâEven if Searles right that programs by themselves arent sufficient to produce intentionality, they still might contribute to the causal powers that underlie intentionality. âEF597B
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Searle commits fallacy of denying the antecedent »
Searle commits fallacy of denying the antecedent
Searle commits fallacy of denying the antecedentâSearles conclusion isnt implied by the premises: 1) if certain brain-process equivalents are present, they produce intentionality; 2) formal computer programs dont have these equivalents. Thus formal computer programs dont have intentionality.âEF597B
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Sufficiency doesn't imply necessary powers »
Sufficiency doesn't imply necessary powers
Sufficiency doesn't imply necessary powersâWe can imagine many systems that are sufficient to produce intentionality but that arent equivalent to the brain. âEF597B
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John Searle »
John Searle
John SearleâArguments advanced by John Searle.âFFFACD
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Entered by:-
David Price
NodeID:
#792
Node type:
SupportiveArgument
Entry date (GMT):
8/1/2006 1:49:00 PM
Last edit date (GMT):
12/11/2007 11:19:00 PM
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