The Pseudorealisation Fallacy
Fantastic realisations of the computational theory of mind, such as Searle's man in a Chinese Room, are irrelevant to empirical psychology. Relevant realisations are subject to empirical constraints; they can't be pseudorealisations.
For instance, although by some stretch the imagination is stomach can be thought of as an information processor, such a realisation is likely to be ad hoc. The stomach must consistently exhibit the kind of processing specified by information processing psychology. One can't just pick out a new section of the stomach each time a new computational state is required.

James Moor, 1988.

"the empirical content of a theory limits the kinds of realizations which are possible." (p. 49)

Note: for more multiple realisability arguments, see the "Is a brain a computer?" arguments on Map 1, the "Can functional states generate consciousness?" arguments on Map 6, and sidebar, "Formal systems: an overview" on Map 7.
Artificial Intelligence »Artificial Intelligence
Can computers think? [1] »Can computers think? [1]
Yes: physical symbol systems can think [3] »Yes: physical symbol systems can think [3]
The Chinese Room Argument [4] »The Chinese Room Argument [4]
The Pseudorealisation Fallacy
Man in Chinese Room would have to be an alien »Man in Chinese Room would have to be an alien
James Moor »James Moor
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