20131119
me
2:35 PM
AH: helpless-hopeless lines up with thesis through disruption of OODA from Boyd loop.
AH: Boyd was fighter pilot; US military observed his success, wanted description of his process; he formulated OODA loop. Observation, orientation, decision, action.
Boydsays ways to break an opponents OODA loop; can undermine their abilityto formulate and carry out viable and meaningful actions.
AH:reverse engineered Boyd's work to figure out how to use OODA loop tore-enstate person's ability to use it in meaningful ways.
AH: when unable to make appropriate observations and make appropriate orientation, psychological experience is helplessness and hopelessness; they are symptoms, not cause, not the condx itself.
AH: real issue is architecture of consciousness which experiences.
AH: bring Carl in on one of these conversations.
Carl Simpson.

 
Alexandra Hart
2:51 PM
Tchniques for dealing with learned helplessness= clinically useful as this is one of the most persistent emotionalaspects of the condition that affects the sense of self such that it isdifficult to leverage the mind towards correcting the underlyingcondition/broken architecture.

 
me
2:54 PM
AH: current: leverage psychological or somatic; must cross that boundary
AH: polarization in the literature

me
3:13 PM
Anticipatory systems, aspects in AH thesis
Complex adaptive systems (CAS) capable of anticipation

 
Alexandra Hart
3:17 PM
Damasio, Antonio, and Hanna Damasio. 2006. Minding the body. Daedalus 135 (3):15-22.

 
me
3:19 PM
AH: section of thesis on empathy
 
Alexandra Hart
3:20 PM
(Gallese 2001)
Evidence for this concept of intersubjectivity is emerging from affective neuroscience, cognitive ethology, evolutionary neurobiology, developmental neuroscience, developmental psychology,and the philosophy of mind and psychology (Cheyne 2001; Thompson 2001 ,pp.5-13). The recent discovery of mirror neurons in cognitiveneuroscience is further evidence for intersubjectivity (Gallese 2001).
Recentfindings with respect to mirror neurons (Gallese 2001) point towards abiological substrate for this initial form of empathy. Affectiveresonance occurs when individuals affect each other’s emotionalstate or when an individual attempts to affect the emotional state ofanother (Thompson 2007, forthcoming p.582).
Treisman(2003) provides a review of the process referred to as binding, theprocess that connects various perceptual events such that they becomeconsciously available. As such, binding involves not only contact but also discernment, attention and possibly feeling. Cotterill (2003) examines the importance of action in the generation of consciousness and its unity. Although binding is broader than contact, investigating the relation between binding, the unity of consciousness and action may provide an explanation for the participants’ experience of “energy”.
Antonio and Hanna Damasio (Damasio and Damasio 2006) have recently reviewed emerging neurological and physiological evidence for Antonio Damasio’s ‘as-if-body-loop’. The Damasios focus on the biological scaffoldingthrough which the body becomes present in and to the mind. They observethat “while the brain does represent, with fidelity, body states thatare actually occurring, it can do far more than that: it can also modifythe representation of an ongoing state, and most dramatically, it can simulate body states before they occur or body states that do not occur at all” (Damasio and Damasio 2006, p.16). 
The authors demonstrate that, just as the body communicates its state to the brain, so the brain also communicates to the body. This loop implies that many of the body states that are being communicated to the brain by the body were derived from communicationfrom the brain to the body in the first place. “Mental states causebrain states, which cause body states; body states are then mapped inthe brain and incorporated into the ongoing mental states” (Damasioand Damasio 2006, p.17). Small changes in the brain can result in largechanges in the body and vice versa. The information processing network referred to as the ‘body-loop’ (Damasio and Damasio 2006, p.18) functions to produce optimal controlling responses when the body provides the brain with information that correctly represents its current state. Additionally, the information processing network referred to as the ‘as-if-body-loop’creates models of body states similar to those that would result if thebody were to actually undergo predicted physiological or emotionalresponses. “In other words, the brain can simulate a certain body stateas if it were occurring; and because our perception of any body stateis rooted in the body maps of the somatosensing regions, weperceive the body state as actually occurring even if it is not”(Damasio and Damasio 2006, p.18). Mirror neurons, which were previouslydiscussed in relation to empathy (see section 5.8), can even, forinstance, simulate in the body an action or emotion that is not actually occurring.
 

Treisman(2003) provides a review of the processreferred to as binding, the process that connects various perceptual eventssuch that they become consciously available. As such, binding involves not onlycontact but also discernment, attention and possibly feeling. Cotterill (2003) examines the importance of actionin the generation of consciousness and its unity. Although binding is broaderthan contact, investigating the relation between binding, the unity ofconsciousness and action may provide an explanation for the participants’experience of “energy”.

Antonioand Hanna Damasio (Damasio andDamasio 2006) have recently reviewed emergingneurological and physiological evidence for Antonio Damasio’s‘as-if-body-loop’. The Damasios focus on the biological scaffolding throughwhich the body becomes present in and to the mind. They observe that “while thebrain does represent, with fidelity, body states that are actually occurring,it can do far more than that: it can also modify the representation of anongoing state, and most dramatically, it can simulate body states before theyoccur or body states that do not occur at all” (Damasio andDamasio 2006, p.16).

Theauthors demonstrate that, just as the body communicates its state to the brain,so the brain also communicates to the body. This loop implies that many of thebody states that are being communicated to the brain by the body were derivedfrom communication from the brain to the body in the first place. “Mentalstates cause brain states, which cause body states; body states are then mappedin the brain and incorporated into the ongoing mental states” (Damasio and Damasio 2006, p.17). Small changes in the brain canresult in large changes in the body and vice versa. The information processingnetwork referred to as the ‘body-loop’ (Damasio and Damasio 2006, p.18) functions to produce optimalcontrolling responses when the body provides the brain with information thatcorrectly represents its current state. Additionally, the informationprocessing network referred to as the ‘as-if-body-loop’ creates models of bodystates similar to those that would result if the body were to actually undergopredicted physiological or emotional responses. “In other words, the brain cansimulate a certain body state as if it were occurring; and because ourperception of any body state is rooted in the body maps of the somatosensingregions, we perceive the body state as actually occurring even if it is not” (Damasio and Damasio 2006, p.18). Mirror neurons, which werepreviously discussed in relation to empathy (see section 5.8), can even, for instance, simulatein the body an action or emotion that is not actually occurring.

Itis reasonable to suggest that a lack of contact may result from a breakdown inthe ‘as-if-body-loop’. This potentially offers an explanation for what theparticipants describe as a lack of “energy”. Part of what the participantsdescribe as a lack of “energy” is a lack of contact with a proprioceptive senseof the capacity to do, the level of ‘physical energy’ that is available to thebody. The participants also describe a pervasive sense that the ‘physicalenergy’ that is available appears to be very limited and unpredictable. If CFSinvolves a general breakdown in contact, then this breakdown in contact wouldbe as likely to affect contact with such a proprioceptive sense of theavailable ‘physical energy’ as with any other aspect of contact. Further, what the‘as-if-body-loop’ implies is that such a breakdown with contact, passed fromthe brain to the body, in body state simulations, could lead to an actualbreakdown of contact with either the proprioceptive sense of the level of‘physical energy’ or, equally, could produce an actual low and unpredictablelevel of ‘physical energy’.

Processesthat sanction action may be involved in how the brain simulates the‘as-if-body-loop’, and also with what the brain does with the feedback derivedfrom the ‘as-if-body-loop’. For instance, an organism may assess what resourcesare necessary for an action in order to create the ‘as-if-body-loop’ for thataction. If the assessment of what is required is unreasonably high or theorganism is making an unreasonably low assessment of the available resourcesthen the organisms’ ability to create the ‘as-if-body-loop’ and the actualactions that they would predict would be impaired. The brain’s assessment ofthe resources that are required and the resources available for performance maybe communicated by the brain to the body to create bodily reality and thencommunicated back to the brain by the body. Consequently, this could be a selfsustaining phenomenon.

 The Damasios’ final conclusion links theneurological and physiological scaffolding for the ‘as-if-body-loop’ to boththe self and empathy for the other: “after allowing us to represent our ownactions and emotional states, actual or simulated, they allow us to simulatethe equivalent states of others. And because we have established a priorconnection between our own body states and their significance, we cansubsequently attribute the same significance to the states of others that wecome to simulate. The body in mind helps us construct our selves and thenallows us to understand others, which is nothing short of astounding” (Damasio and Damasio 2006, p.22). This potentially provides furtherexplanation for the changes in self that are related in chapters 9 and 10. A lack of action means a decayingamount of proprioceptive information from which to make a self. In as far as transformation is an action, alack of adequate contact could undermine the ability to transform. Perhaps thelack of letting go demonstrated by the ‘having an illness self’ is a reflectionof a lack of contact. Similarly, a lack of emotional information may underminethe ability to accurately construct the self. All the activities that theparticipants describe as recharging their “energy” are described as meditative.Meditative, in this context, does not imply doing nothing. These meditativeactivities involve interoceptive (for example, insight meditation) andexteroceptive (for example, Qigong and Hatha Yoga) doing, including consciouslychoosing not to do. Is it possible that there is an aspect of these activitiesthat reinstates contact? Operational closure in the context of the Damasio’swork would certainly suggest that paying attention to emotion, which is both aphenomenal and physiological process, would produce neurophysiological changes.
 
Gallese, V. 2001. The 'Shared Manifold' Hypothesis:From Mirror Neurons to Empathy. In BetweenOurselves: Second-person issues in the study of consciousness, edited by E.Thompson. Thorverton: Imprint Academic.
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