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Some weak evidence for entropy clocks VoorArgument1 #114533 Since Eddington's time extensive neurological and psychological studies have sought to identify time-keeping mechanisms in the brain. Some hypothesized mechanisms are based on the rate of decay of memories, which would be aligned with the direction of increasing entropy (see citation). | |
+Citaten (3) - CitatenVoeg citaat toeList by: CiterankMapLink[1] The Inner Experience of Time
Citerend uit: Marc Whittmann - Department of Psychiatry, University of California, San Diego Geciteerd door: Peter Baldwin 0:52 AM 29 July 2011 GMT Citerank: (3) 109447Psychologically, we inhabit a 'specious present'Psychological and neurological studies suggest that we do not perceive events moment-by-moment but rather integrate them into perceptual units of approximately 2 to 3 seconds duration. This results in successive events forming a perceptual unity that can be apprehended without recourse to memory.959C6EF, 109448Multiple neural clocksModern neurology has failed to identify any single neural clock in the human brain. Current evidence suggests the brain has multiple time-keeping mechanisms, specialized to different durations. One proposed mechanism based on the rate of decay of memories may have some relation to entropy.959C6EF, 114551Brain doesn't work with instantsNeurological studies show that the brain does not work with instants. It works with an 'extended present' (aka specious present) generally thought to be 2 to 3 seconds duration. Given this, it is feasible for the brains working memory to apprehend memory accretion. See also Julian Barbour citation.13EF597B URL:
| Fragment- "The aforementioned psychological factors definitely influence the processing of duration. However, a specific neural timing mechanism—influenced by the aforementioned factors—nevertheless, could account for our ability to accurately process temporal intervals. Especially for shorter durations up to a few seconds, humans can accurately synchronize their movements to regular beats (Mates et al. 1994), discriminate tones with different durations (Rammsayer & Lima 1991) or reproduce presented intervals (Eisler and Eisler 1994). Yet, there is no consensus as to which temporal mechanisms account for these temporal-processing abilities. Over the last decades, the most successful models for such a mechanism have been variants of a pacemaker–accumulator clock, where an oscillator (a pacemaker) produces a series of pulses (analogous to the ticks of a clock) and the number of pulses recorded over a given timespan represents experienced duration (Poppel 1971; Church 1984; Treisman et al. 1990; Meck 1996; Zakay and Block 1997). However, competing models assume neuronal system properties for encoding duration not related to a simple pacemaker–accumulator system (Matell and Meck 2004; Wackermann and Ehm 2006; Karmarkar and Buonomano 2007), or they propose that memory decay processes are involved in time perception (Staddon 2005; Wackermann & Ehm 2006). Related to this unsolved issue, the question of which areas of the brain process duration has also not yet been answered definitely. Among other regions, most prominently, the cerebellum (Ivry & Spencer 2004), the right posterior parietal cortex (Bueti et al. 2008a), the right prefrontal cortex (Rubia & Smith 2004; Lewis & Miall 2006) as well as fronto-striatal circuits (Harrington et al. 2004a; Hinton & Meck 2004) have been implicated as the neural substrates of a potential timekeeping mechanism |
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