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Psychologically, we inhabit a 'specious present' Stelling1 #109447 Psychological and neurological studies suggest that we do not perceive events moment-by-moment but rather integrate them into perceptual units of approximately 2 to 3 seconds duration. This results in successive events forming a perceptual unity that can be apprehended without recourse to memory. | This discovery bears on the philosophical debate about the 'specious present' - so called because it is a duration rather than an instant of time (see citation below). The evidence cited below indicates that our brains are incapable of perceiving a moment in time - at least in the sense of an infinitesimally short duration - even if such a thing existed. |
+Citaten (3) - CitatenVoeg citaat toeList by: CiterankMapLink[1] The Inner Experience of Time
Citerend uit: Marc Whittmann - Department of Psychiatry, University of California, San Diego Geciteerd door: Peter Baldwin 4:54 AM 23 May 2011 GMT Citerank: (3) 109448Multiple neural clocksModern neurology has failed to identify any single neural clock in the human brain. Current evidence suggests the brain has multiple time-keeping mechanisms, specialized to different durations. One proposed mechanism based on the rate of decay of memories may have some relation to entropy.959C6EF, 114533Some weak evidence for entropy clocksSince Eddington's time extensive neurological and psychological studies have sought to identify time-keeping mechanisms in the brain. Some hypothesized mechanisms are based on the rate of decay of memories, which would be aligned with the direction of increasing entropy (see citation).1198CE71, 114551Brain doesn't work with instantsNeurological studies show that the brain does not work with instants. It works with an 'extended present' (aka specious present) generally thought to be 2 to 3 seconds duration. Given this, it is feasible for the brains working memory to apprehend memory accretion. See also Julian Barbour citation.13EF597B URL:
| Fragment- "On a different time scale, a perceptual mechanism seems to exist that integrates separate successive events into a unit or perceptual gestalt (see Poppel 2009). We do not just perceive individual events in isolation, but automatically integrate them into perceptual units with a duration of approximately 2–3 s (Fraisse 1984; Poppel 1997). For example, while listening to a metronome at a moderate speed, we do not hear a train of individual beats, but automatically form perceptual units, such as 1–2–3, 1–2–3, etc. These are mental constructs—physically speaking, they do not exist. The duration of this temporal integration mechanism, referred to as the subjective present, seems to be limited to 2–3 s (Szelag et al. 1996; Wittmann & Poppel 2000)."
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"The notion that perception and motor behaviour are processed in discrete windows or processing epochs has been conceptualized for some time (White 1963; Poppel 1970; Dehaene 1993; VanRullen & Koch 2003; Fingelkurts & Fingelkurts 2006). These temporal integration units fuse successive events into a unitary experience, ‘snapshots of experience’ or ‘psychological presents’ (Blumenthal 1977), which are characterized by co-temporality, meaning that events within this time zone have no temporal relationship (Ruhnau 1995). For example, the perception of temporal order of short stimuli in different modalities is only possible if the individual events are separated by at least 20–60 ms (Exner 1875; Hirsh & Sherrick 1961; Kanabus et al. 2002; Fink et al. 2006). f the two events are separated by smaller intervals, an observer is not able to tell which of the two appeared first." |
Link[3] Time perception
Citerend uit: Encyclopedia Britannica Geciteerd door: Peter Baldwin 4:14 AM 24 August 2011 GMT URL:
| Fragment- THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESENT To perceive is to become aware of stimulation. Awareness of sequence or duration may, at first glance, seem inconsistent with the definition of perceiving. In a mathematical sense, certainly, the present is only a point along the continuum of becoming, an instant when future is transformed into past. Nevertheless, there is indeed a more prolonged psychological present, a brief period during which successive events seem to form a perceptual unity and can be apprehended without calling on memory. There is a perceptual field for time just as there is a visual field. The rate or speed of a sequence determines the limits of the time field. When a metronome tics two or three times a second, one perceives an integral sequence, becoming aware of a rhythmic auditory series characterized by a perceptually distinct frequency. When the ticks come less often, however—at intervals of three seconds, say—the frequency or sequence no longer is perceived. Each physically discrete sound impulse remains an isolated perceptual event; each tick is no longer perceived as belonging to the same temporal field as the one that follows. Similar effects can be achieved by playing a recording of music or speech at a very slow rate. Music or spoken sentences are recognizable only when their elements (melody, rhythmic patterns, phrase) are presented at an optimal speed that permits significant perceptual unity; that is, only when they belong to the relative simultaneity of the psychological present. The perceived field of time also depends on the number of stimulus elements presented. When a clock strikes three or four times, one knows without counting that it is three or four o’clock. At noon one must count; the first chimes no longer belong to the psychological present that includes the last. Most people also can repeat a series of letters or numbers they hear, so long as there are no more than seven or eight elements. This ability varies with the degree of perceptual (e.g., semantic) organization among the elements. While most adults can apprehend only about eight letters, they can grasp and repeat without fault sentences of 20 to 25 syllables. |
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