The Imitation Game is an all-purpose test
Playing the imitation game is a "second order" ability that presupposes many other abilities. Hence, it is misleading to characterize the ability to pass the game as just one example or property of thinking.
The Stevenson Argument

"As for (1) [Gunderson's argument that thinking is 'all-purpose' and irreducible to one example], upon which Gunderson expounds in sections (V) and (V1) of his paper, being able to play the imitation game is itself an 'all-purpose' sort of property, which is correctly attributable to something only if that thing possesses a very large range of other properties" (Stevenson, 1976, p. 131).

"For no doubt the general point about the inference from ability to abilities is correct, but the ability to successfully play the imitation game is supposed to be a special, one might say second-order, ability, the possession of which would legitimize inferences to many other abilities" (Stevenson, 1976, p. 132).

John Stevenson (1976) "On the Imitation Game." Philosophia 6:1:131-133.
Immediately related elementsHow this works
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Artificial Intelligence »Artificial Intelligence
Can the Turing Test determine this? [2]  »Can the Turing Test determine this? [2] 
Yes: human imitation is sufficient »Yes: human imitation is sufficient
One example can't explain thinking »One example can't explain thinking
The Imitation Game is an all-purpose test
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