Some Political Considerations in Fighting Corruption
By Robert Klitgaard, Dean, The RAND Graduate School, Santa Monica, CA
Beyond diagnosing corrupt systems and developing a list of proposed improvements, it is necessary to develop a political strategy for fighting corruption. This is a vast and subtle topic, but here are some of the important considerations.
!" Who will spearhead the government’s efforts? Experience suggests that an anti-corruption effort needs both one person in charge and the idea that “in charge” means coordinating a variety of agencies that must be involved in fighting corruption.
!" What is the “low-hanging fruit”? To build momentum, it’s important to select a relatively easy-to-fix corruption problem first. More generally, one must carefully sequence the steps in an anti- corruption strategy.
!" Which are the favorable forces in the political environment and how can the government align its efforts with them? Consider business groups, professional associations, NGOs, the press, students, international organizations, the military. Involve these forces in analyzing corrupt systems, in suggesting alternatives, in mobilizing resources, and in monitoring progress.
!" If there is a culture of impunity, it can only be ruptured by “frying big fish.” Select a few big violators including those who give as well as receive bribes-and go after them.
!" Building political support has a number of other dimensions. One must create a sequenced publicity campaign to raise the profile of the anti-corruption effort. Within the public sector, it is important to do
something good for government officials before seeming to attack them.
!" Strengthen institutional capacity not only through “supply-side measures” (more training, more experts, more computers) but especially through changing systems of information and incentives.
!" Contextualize any anti-corruption strategy as part of a broader vision of transforming governance. For example, link it with ideas such as systematic client consultation, pay-for-performance, and privatization with high-quality regulation.
A final point: what if the people on top don’t want to fight corruption?
Then the questions become these.
Can political leaders nonetheless be drawn into a systematic effort at reform through a combination of domestic and international pressure?
Can this systematic effort be made as tamper-proof and non-political as possible?
If political leaders cannot be drawn into such an effort, or if they undermine it, then we must consider how corrupt systems can be “subverted” through the efforts of the private sector and civil society?
It turns out there are many possibilities.
*These ideas are drawn from the new book by Robert Klitgaard, Ronald MacLean-Abaroa, and H. Lindsey
Parris, Jr., Corrupt Cities (Oakland: ICS Press, 2000).