Sanctions

            The subject of ‘sanctions involves the issue of means to ensure adherence to agreements, laws, treaties, to replace sanctions based on coercion / threat of coercion and application of force by an enforcement agency more powerful than any potential violator, by sanctions that are automatically triggered by the very attempt of violation.

            Problem / Rationale

            Traditionally, the critical societal concern to ensure adherence to laws, contracts, social standards, ethical and moral rules, regulations, and agreements among parties to end or resolve conflicts,  has been addressed by the institution of sanctions:  ‘penalties’, that is, disagreeable, painful, costly consequences for breaking such rules. The primitive conflict-resolving means has been fighting: violence or the threat of violence:  physical force inflicted by one party in a conflict upon the other, causing fear, pain, incapacitation, wounding or death, ending the ability of the weaker or more fearful party to continue the fight.  With the evolution of the effectiveness of weaponry, the outcome of fights as conflict-resolution tools became less predictable, increasing the willingness of contestants to agree to less violent means, such as letting ‘referees’ or ‘judges’ decide the merit of disagreements and to both abide by such decisions. Ultimately, however, even adherence to judges’ decisions -- and especially the decisions of ‘penalties’ for having violated rules -- had to be ensured by the threat of application of force by some ‘enforcement’ entity. That entity inherently has to be stronger, i.e. be able to apply greater force, than any of the potential adversaries in a society: police or military. The distinction between police (responsible for adherence to rules within a society) and military (concerned with threats and conflicts with other societies) may not have been as clear initially as it is today.

            It soon became very clear that there was a major problem with such provisions:  the entity charged with ‘keeping the peace’ by virtue of having greater force at it disposal than any other part of a society, was in constant temptation of itself violating the societal rules to its own advantage -- since there was no greater force to keep it from doing so.  The addictive effect of such power (power being itself the manifestation of the human desire for ‘freedom’:  being able to do what one wants to do...) led to the phenomenon of tyrants and dictators and the historically continuous and costly trouble of having to remove them when their rule became intolerable.

                        Religions introduced a solution to this problem by assigning the role of ‘judge’ to a supernatural being -- god, who would then administer the rewards and penalties for adhering or breaking moral rules in the hereafter. The solution must be considered only partial, because even where the faithful were successfully led to believe that the rules were truly established by the supernatural being, they were interpreted quite differently by factions within the religious institutions set up to do this: institutions that themselves became entities of power, for which the factions were competing, seeking dominance or at the very least independence from other factions. In other words, these institutions were as much vulnerable to the temptations of power. And more often than not, they sought to extend, let their power over spiritual issues spill over into the secular domain, and actually taking it upon themselves to dispense sanctions in the here-and-now, by excommunication, shaming, and subjecting 'heretics' as well as societal 'criminals' to loss of freedom (imprisonment),  physical punishment,  torture and death.

            In 'foreign relations', conflicts among nations, states, the religious means of conflict resolution were never as successful, and even if invoked, nearly always 'reinforced' by crude application or threat of application of violence: war. Within the last century, the means of warfare have become so dangerous that they pose a serious threat to the survival even of the 'winners' of military conflicts. This led to the call for a 'global' institution able to prevent such military conflicts by other ('nonviolent') means of conflict resolutions.  Such an institution must have the means of imposing sanctions for violations of resulting agreements and agreed-upon rules.  The discussion of the nature of such sanctions, as well as the concerns about the 'enforcement' entity therefore become the supremely critical topics of an increasingly 'globalized' humanity:  how to ensure that the global 'enforcement' entity will adhere to its own rules, and to prevent it from succumbing to the temptations of power -- which in the secular realm would means ultimate power. The specter of a 'world government' turning into a world tyranny unrestrained by any other force is a real enough threat, if the logical dilemma of ensuring adherence to rules and laws by means of enforcement of sanctions cannot be escaped. (The concern, ironically, is voiced most loudly by the very parties currently being in the closest position to a 'world policeman'  or world government -- and worried about losing that status…)

            The question and challenge is therefore the following:  to develop means of ensuring adherence to agreements, rules, laws, that do not depend on 'enforcement' by a greater power.  This could be seen as the societal challenge equal in seriousness to the challenge of sustainability of humanity's use of resources and damage to the natural environment.  'Solving' one of these problems without the other will be futile and pointless.

            Possible solutions

            Is it possible to invent and apply such provisions? Currently, the answer may seem elusive, the challenge almost utopian.  But there are both precedents and emerging tools that seem promising enough to suggest that this issue be investigated, solutions developed and discussed with the highest priority. The search for means to ensure adherence to rules might be called the project of 'automatically triggered sanctions' -- sanctions triggered by the very attempt at violation, that therefore do not require a stronger, bigger 'enforcement' agency.

            Precedents include the custom of mutually exchanging 'hostages' and ambassadors:  not ordinary citizens but important people (on both sides: the emphasis is on 'mutual'), the children of the highest and most important families, the most eminent politicians put into the power of the opposing parties as insurance against breaking treaties and agreements.  The hostages would be killed or punished in the case of aggressive or inimical actions of the other side.

            The concept of 'hostage' might be explored and extended from people-hostages, for example, to important infrastructure, communications or other significant aspects of mutual functioning of society.

            Technical means are within reach already, at small scale. Devices that detect whether a driver of a car is inebriated,  that can be linked to the ignition, and prevent a drunk driver from even starting a car,  are feasible and available today. If implemented for all cars, the considerable institutional resources for  detecting, pursuing, apprehending and punishing drunk drivers, as well as the damage they cause if  not detected in time, could be avoided.

            Another example,  feasible with today's technology,  would be the devices detecting violations of speed limits.  Currently, the violations are recorded, kept in data bases, then prosecuted through a cumbersome bureaucratic system, ending with a fine to be paid, usually through a financial institutions to a governmental agency, all piling up  records in data banks whose security against abuse. fraud, and privacy violations are themselves called into question.  Instead, the violation might be signaled not to some central office but to the driver's combined driver's license cum credit card, where the violation and possible 'fine' (or points towards revoking the license)  would be recorded -- and only there.  If violations exceed some defined limit, or the credit account has insufficient funds, the license is inactivated.  No other entities or agencies need to be involved.

            The 'currency' in which sanctions are implemented can be other than money:  the currency of drunk driver device is a right:  the license to drive, obtained by the 'promise' or agreement to obey the rules of the road. This concept can be extended to the 'license' to carry out activities in positions of power:  the 'licence' to occupy a power position might be obtained by the 'deposit' of a specific amount of 'civic credit points' which are used up with decisions, and against which violations of the rules against abuse can be charged, in the extreme resulting in the automatic revoking of the right to that position (e.g. metaphorically, the power abuser would be 'locked out' of his office or 'bridge - battle station' ).

            These are small-scale examples of forms of 'sanctions' or means of ensuring adherence to rules, meeting the stated criterion of not requiring powerful enforcement entities. The development of effective forms of this kind of tools -- especially at the level of international relations, -- should be a global project of highest priority.  The development of such means would be a major contribution to the problem of control of power. (>>>…)

            These suggestions are not intended to minimize the role of another traditional tool -- that of education aimed at establishing a firm foundation of moral and ethical values in all individuals, that would 'inoculate' everyone against the temptations of rule violations and power abuse. This  issue too needs to be pursued and more effective solutions developed than the current practice (that has not so far been able to prevent violations).  The question is whether improved means of ethical education obviated the search for better means to ensure that the ethical principles are indeed adhered to, and that agreements about resolving conflicting opinions about such instances do not escalate into violent conflict.