Theorems show limitations of machine thought
Gödel’s theorem, and other mathematical theorems like it, reveal essential limitations on the project of making machines that think.
Note: This region covers those arguments that don't derive from Lucas or Penrose but still deal with Gödelian limitations; that is, with the limitations that Gödel’s theorem—and other similar theorems—impose on machine and/or human intelligence.
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Artificial Intelligence »Artificial Intelligence
Are thinking computers mathematically possible? [7] »Are thinking computers mathematically possible? [7]
No: computers are limited by Gödel's theorems »No: computers are limited by Gödel's theorems
Theorems show limitations of machine thought
Gödel's first theorem »Gödel's first theorem
Gödel's second theorem »Gödel's second theorem
Gödel's and Church's theorems are psychological laws »Gödel's and Church's theorems are psychological laws
Machines can't understand language like humans »Machines can't understand language like humans
Mathematical thought can't be fully formalised »Mathematical thought can't be fully formalised
Mathematics is an essentially creative activity »Mathematics is an essentially creative activity
The argument from Church's theorem »The argument from Church's theorem
A human can't simultaneously beat all machines »A human can't simultaneously beat all machines
Machines may eventually have mathematical intuition »Machines may eventually have mathematical intuition
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