Good misunderstands the game
The game's played with the machine's designer not the machine—and is about what the mechanist, not the machine, can do. It shows that for any given mechanist machine, the mentalist—who knows Gödel’s theorem—can show that he's not that machine.
Good misunderstands nature of the game between the mechanist and the mentalist:

  • The game is not played with a machine but with the machine's designer. The game is about what mechanist can do, not about what the machine can do.
  • The game is not concerned with showing superiority of humans over all machines. All the game shows is that for any particular machine the mechanist presents, the mentalist—who knows Gödel’s theorem—can show that he or she is not that machine.
John Lucas (1967).
Immediately related elementsHow this works
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Artificial Intelligence »Artificial Intelligence
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Are thinking computers mathematically possible? [7] »Are thinking computers mathematically possible? [7]
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No: computers are limited by Gödel's theorems »No: computers are limited by Gödel's theorems
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Argument from Gödel's theorem is dialectical »Argument from Gödel's theorem is dialectical
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A machine can play Lucas's game »A machine can play Lucas's game
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Good misunderstands the game
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Gödel’s theorem is a red herring »Gödel’s theorem is a red herring
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John Lucas »John Lucas
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