At least act of willing is for this (last) end
It is impossible for the very act elicited by the will to be the last end. [...] Consequently, if a human action be the last end, it must be an action commanded by the will: so that at least the act of willing, is for the end....
Reply to Objection 2. If any human action be the last end, it must be voluntary, else it would not be human, as stated above. Now an action is voluntary in one of two ways: first, because it is commanded by the will, e.g. to walk, or to speak; secondly, because it is elicited by the will, for instance the very act of willing. Now it is impossible for the very act elicited by the will to be the last end. For the object of the will is the end, just as the object of sight is color: wherefore just as the first visible cannot be the act of seeing, because every act of seeing is directed to a visible object; so the first appetible, i.e. the end, cannot be the very act of willing. Consequently it follows that if a human action be the last end, it must be an action commanded by the will: so that there, some action of man, at least the act of willing, is for the end. Therefore whatever a man does, it is true to say that man acts for an end, even when he does that action in which the last end consists.
Λεπτομέρειες πλοηγού
(Βοήθεια)
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Man's last end »Man's last end
1. Whether it belongs to man to act for an end? »1. Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?
It would seem that it does not »It would seem that it does not
Action may be the last end, thus not for an end »Action may be the last end, thus not for an end
At least act of willing is for this (last) end
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