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John Lucas
Πρωταγωνιστής
1
#2778
Arguments advanced by John Lucas.
Λεπτομέρειες πλοηγού
(Βοήθεια)
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Artificial Intelligence »
Artificial Intelligence
Artificial Intelligence☜A collaboratively editable version of Robert Horns brilliant and pioneering debate map Can Computers Think?—exploring 50 years of philosophical argument about the possibility of computer thought.☜F1CEB7
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Protagonists »
Protagonists
Protagonists☜The contributions of over 300 protagonists can be explored via a surname search, or using the growing list developing here.☜D3B8AB
■
John Lucas
John Lucas☜Arguments advanced by John Lucas.☜D3B8AB
►
Consciousness requires a point of view »
Consciousness requires a point of view
Consciousness requires a point of view☜A conscious machine could be built but only if built with a point of view—evidenced by: homeostatic behaviour; holistic assessment of context and context dependent responses; and ascribing consciousness to it provided offered some explanatory power.☜FFFACD
►
Gödel shows machines can't be fully conscious »
Gödel shows machines can't be fully conscious
Gödel shows machines can't be fully conscious☜A machine needs a consciousness-producing part—eg a Gödelizing operator—to understand its own Gödel sentence. Hence, machines can have partial consciousness at best; unlike humans, who dont need a special part to reflect on themselves.☜FFFACD
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Gödel sentences sufficiently self-referential »
Gödel sentences sufficiently self-referential
Gödel sentences sufficiently self-referential☜Gödel sentences by themselves arent self-referential, but recognising their truth requires us to see them as self-referential. Machines lack this ability to see Gödel sentences as self-referential—so cant recognise the truth of Gödel sentences.☜FFFACD
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Machines aren't self-critical »
Machines aren't self-critical
Machines aren't self-critical☜Consciousness should be construed in terms of the ability for self-critical thinking—which requires a concept of truth. Because machines lack an adequate concept of truth, as Webb admits, they cant think critically in the way the humans can.☜FFFACD
►
Lucas claims less than Wang's dilemma suggests »
Lucas claims less than Wang's dilemma suggests
Lucas claims less than Wang's dilemma suggests☜Only those machines we know to be consistent are adequate candidates for models of the mind—and we can often tell this. Mechanists dont need to know the consistency of all machines, just that the ones presented to the mentalist are consistent.☜FFFACD
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Good misunderstands the game »
Good misunderstands the game
Good misunderstands the game☜The games played with the machines designer not the machine—and is about what the mechanist, not the machine, can do. It shows that for any given mechanist machine, the mentalist—who knows Gödel’s theorem—can show that hes not that machine.☜FFFACD
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We don't need the entire Lucas arithmetic »
We don't need the entire Lucas arithmetic
We don't need the entire Lucas arithmetic☜A mentalist doesnt have to produce all of the Lucas arithmetic. Its sufficient that he produce enough of the Lucas arithmetic to answer the mechanist at a given step of the game.☜FFFACD
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No: computers are limited by Gödel's theorems »
No: computers are limited by Gödel's theorems
No: computers are limited by Gödel's theorems☜Gödels theorem proves that a computer cant in principle operate with human understanding (see detailed text). Gödels incompleteness theorems are the Achilles heel of mechanism. John Lucas (1961).☜FFFACD
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Un-Gödelizable machine wouldn't be a machine »
Un-Gödelizable machine wouldn't be a machine
Un-Gödelizable machine wouldn't be a machine☜Machines behave in a determinate manner according to definite rules. But any such determinate machine is susceptible to the Gödelization procedure because its behaviour can be formalised. Any machine that cant be Gödelized isnt really a machine.☜FFFACD
►
A dilemma about inductive machines »
A dilemma about inductive machines
A dilemma about inductive machines☜Seeking to avoid the Gödelization problem by making inductive machines results in a dilemma (see detailed text). An inductive machine isnt an adequate model of the mind.☜FFFACD
►
Machine isn't capable of informal proof »
Machine isn't capable of informal proof
Machine isn't capable of informal proof☜A machine isnt capable of informal proof in the human sense. No matter how informal a machines reasoning may appear to be, it will still be grounded in a formal system; so its informal proofs also formalisable, and subject to the Gödel procedure.☜FFFACD
►
A self-Gödelizing machine can still be out-Gödeled »
A self-Gödelizing machine can still be out-Gödeled
A self-Gödelizing machine can still be out-Gödeled☜The Gödelizing operator—to be programmable—must be specified by some finite rule. But in that case, the Gödelizing operator is itself formalisable. The resulting system can be shown to contain a formula thats true but cant be proven in the system.☜FFFACD
►
A single person's understanding of Gödel is enough »
A single person's understanding of Gödel is enough
A single person's understanding of Gödel is enough☜The power of reasoning demonstrated by a single person who understands Gödel theorem is sufficient to show that minds are different from machines.☜FFFACD
►
Benacerraf’s argument is inconsistent »
Benacerraf’s argument is inconsistent
Benacerraf’s argument is inconsistent☜Benacerraf cant consistently claim that no particular program represents me and at the same time that some program represents me.☜FFFACD
►
Lucas sure that he isn't a machine »
Lucas sure that he isn't a machine
Lucas sure that he isn't a machine☜The arguments mistakenly cast as a nondialectical proof sequence, giving an incorrect conclusion that the man is machine but cant tell which machine he is—the only way I can be sure of not being any particular machine is by not being one at all.☜FFFACD
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There are overriding reasons to regard minds as consistent »
There are overriding reasons to regard minds as consistent
There are overriding reasons to regard minds as consistent☜Huttons argument for the inconsistency of mind is flawed (see detailed text).☜FFFACD
►
An inconsistent machine can't model the mind »
An inconsistent machine can't model the mind
An inconsistent machine can't model the mind☜Although its true Gödel’s theorem doesnt apply to inconsistent machines, this matters not as inconsistent machines cant model the mind. Human minds are geared for consistency—they seek it and use it as a norm for judging which beliefs to accept.☜FFFACD
►
The mechanist's dilemma »
The mechanist's dilemma
The mechanist's dilemma☜The Lucas argument can be restated as a dilemma about consistency (see detailed text).☜FFFACD
◄
John Lucas »
John Lucas
John Lucas☜Arguments advanced by John Lucas.☜FFFACD
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Προστέθηκε από:-
David Price
NodeID:
#2778
Node type:
Protagonist
Ημερ/νία δημιουργίας(GMT):
7/20/2007 6:12:00 PM
Ημερ/νία τελευτ. επεξεργασίας(GMT time):
7/20/2007 6:12:00 PM
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