Gödel shows machines can't be fully conscious
A machine needs a consciousness-producing part—eg a Gödelizing operator—to understand its own Gödel sentence. Hence, machines can have partial consciousness at best; unlike humans, who don't need a special part to reflect on themselves.
John Lucas (1961).



Λεπτομέρειες πλοηγού
(Βοήθεια)
-
Artificial Intelligence »Artificial Intelligence
Are thinking computers mathematically possible? [7] »Are thinking computers mathematically possible? [7]
No: computers are limited by Gödel's theorems »No: computers are limited by Gödel's theorems
Gödel shows machines can't be fully conscious
Gödel sentences are not self-referential »Gödel sentences are not self-referential
Lucas' interpretation allows conscious machines »Lucas' interpretation allows conscious machines
Machines don't need new parts »Machines don't need new parts
John Lucas »John Lucas
+Σχόλια (0)
+Αναφορές (0)
+About