Theorems show limitations of machine thought
Gödel’s theorem, and other mathematical theorems like it, reveal essential limitations on the project of making machines that think.
Note: This region covers those arguments that don't derive from Lucas or Penrose but still deal with Gödelian limitations; that is, with the limitations that Gödel’s theorem—and other similar theorems—impose on machine and/or human intelligence.
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Artificial Intelligence »Artificial Intelligence
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Are thinking computers mathematically possible? [7] »Are thinking computers mathematically possible? [7]
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No: computers are limited by Gödel's theorems »No: computers are limited by Gödel's theorems
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Theorems show limitations of machine thought
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Gödel's first theorem »Gödel's first theorem
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Gödel's second theorem »Gödel's second theorem
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Gödel's and Church's theorems are psychological laws »Gödel's and Church's theorems are psychological laws
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Machines can't understand language like humans »Machines can't understand language like humans
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Mathematical thought can't be fully formalised »Mathematical thought can't be fully formalised
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Mathematics is an essentially creative activity »Mathematics is an essentially creative activity
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The argument from Church's theorem »The argument from Church's theorem
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A human can't simultaneously beat all machines »A human can't simultaneously beat all machines
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Machines may eventually have mathematical intuition »Machines may eventually have mathematical intuition
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