"Our answer to the argument from the STR against the ontological separation of space-time is now clear: the three basic assumptions of the argument are not valid when the notions of past, present and future, that are introduced in this paper, are involved. On one side, these notions of past, present and future are based on the ontological distinction between realized and unrealized events. In the context of Minkowski space-time, the ontological relation R on events yields this distinction. Since R is not definable in terms of the STR causal relation, R is not a temporal but an ontological relation, and the notions of past, present and future are not temporal but ontological notions. On the other side, the frame dependent temporal notions, such as the notion of 'simultaneity', do not have any immediate implications for the ontological distinction between realized and not realized events. The frame dependent temporal notions reflect the fact that the STR causal relation is only partly informative on ontological issues: only for the events causally connectable to an event e it is certain whether they are realized with respect to the event e. Hence, the frame dependent temporal relations between causally nonconnectable events can differ from frame to frame without causing any 'ontological trouble'. This separation of time from ontology is the most important implication of the accommodation, presented in this paper, of the doctrine of the open future to the STR."