The politics of power analysis
Power analysis in IR/IPE has come to challenge the presumed twofold link in realist power analysis, that is, between control over resources and control over outcomes, and between control over outcomes and rule/governance. Institutionalism found the power concept that undergirds *balance of power theories wanting. Yet their remedies run into a dilemma: they either maintain a probabilistic predictive framework, but reduce the importance of power therein, or they maintain a strong causal role for power, yet at the (for many acceptable) price of little generalisable power analysis. Concepts of structural power, mainly developed within IPE, have shown a different understanding of the second link between outcomes and international rule, stressing non-intentional power and the systematic bias of the international system. Finally, poststructuralist and constructivist power analysis focus on symbolic power in the tacit consensus with which routines and discursive practices give authority to particular ideas and agents and construct the very meaning and usage of power in international diplomacy.
This discussion shows that even if careful scholarly discussion can discard some conceptualisations, there is not one root concept of power which we can unravel simply by digging deeper. Power concepts derive their meaning from the theories in which they are embedded. Conceptual analysis has its limits in the *meta-theoretical divides that plague and enrich social theorising: how to combine individualist and holistic, materialist and idealist ontologies?
Yet, we cannot just pick and choose a type of power analysis, as if such choices were politically innocent. The reason is that some concepts, like power, have a special status in our political discourse. They are used for a variety of purposes. For power, two are particularly important. Power is used in practical contexts in which we are interested in what we can do to others and what others can do to us. It is also important in moral/legal contexts where it functions as an indicator of effective responsibility: if actors could not have done an act (if they had not the capacity to do so), they cannot be found guilty for it. The first indicates the realm of action; power becomes an indicator of politics as the ‘art of the possible’. The second assesses possible blame. Put into a wider frame: power is about a counterfactual, that is, about things which could have been otherwise. Invoking power therefore asks for a justification why things were done the way they were.
Therefore, choosing concepts of power which are relatively narrow diminish the realm where ‘something can be done’ and in which action needs to be justified. This is an important issue when e.g. discussing non-intentional effects. By limiting the practical context to only those actions with which we intend to affect others, we rule out any moral judgments unintended effects; collateral damage, as it were. Leaving out non-intentional power mobilises a status quo research bias and blinds us for the tacit power of the strong. This also applies to the mobilisation of bias, be it more materialist or ideational. Seeing this as ‘systematic luck’, means we ‘have no choice’ but to live with this fateful polity. Power, understood as an indicator for the ‘art of the possible’ is ruled out. This argument can cut both ways, of course, when wider concepts of power suggest realms for action where there are possibly none. The fundamental point is that invoking the presence of power politicises issues.
But power analysis is even more directly political. This results from a curious paradox. Scholars often engage in debates about where power ‘really’ lies, e.g. whether it is rather hard or ‘soft’. By doing this, they must appeal to an underlying idea that we can know this is in a somewhat objective way. Were power measurable, such debates would be quite pointless however. Precisely because power is not as fungible as money and its understanding is to some extent conventional, do observers try to shape the common understanding and fix the meaning what and where power ‘really’ lies. For such meanings have direct political effects on national security and foreign policy doctrines.
References and further reading
Aron, R. (1962) Paix et guerre entre les nations, Paris: Calmann-Lévy.
Ashley, R. (1989) ‘Imposing International Purpose: Notes on a Problematique of Governance’, in E.-O. Czempiel and J. Rosenau (eds) Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s, 251-290, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.
Bourdieu, P. (1992) Language and Symbolic Power, Oxford: Polity Press.
Baldwin, D. (1989) Paradoxes of Power, Oxford: Blackwell.
Caporaso, J. (1978) ‘Dependence, Dependency and Power in the Global System: a Structural and Behavioral Analysis’, International Organization 32, 1: 13-43.
Connolly, W. (1974) The Terms of Political Discourse, Oxford: Martin Robertson.
Dowding, K. (1996) Power, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Gill, S. and D. Law (1989) ‘Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital’, International Studies Quarterly 33, 4: 475-99.
Guzzini, S. (1993) ‘Structural Power: the Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis’, International Organization 47, 3: 443-78.
Keohane, R. and J. Nye (2000) Power and Interdependence, 3rd ed., New York: Longman.
Keohane, R. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Krasner, S. (1985) Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Lukes, S. (1974) Power: A Radical View, London: Macmillan.
Mearsheimer, J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W.W. Norton.
Morriss, P. (2002) Power: A Philosophical Analysis, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Strange, S. (1988) States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy, New York: Basil Blackwell.
Power analysis in IR/IPE has come to challenge the presumed twofold link in realist power analysis, that is, between control over resources and control over outcomes, and between control over outcomes and rule/governance. Institutionalism found the power concept that undergirds *balance of power theories wanting. Yet their remedies run into a dilemma: they either maintain a probabilistic predictive framework, but reduce the importance of power therein, or they maintain a strong causal role for power, yet at the (for many acceptable) price of little generalisable power analysis. Concepts of structural power, mainly developed within IPE, have shown a different understanding of the second link between outcomes and international rule, stressing non-intentional power and the systematic bias of the international system. Finally, poststructuralist and constructivist power analysis focus on symbolic power in the tacit consensus with which routines and discursive practices give authority to particular ideas and agents and construct the very meaning and usage of power in international diplomacy.
This discussion shows that even if careful scholarly discussion can discard some conceptualisations, there is not one root concept of power which we can unravel simply by digging deeper. Power concepts derive their meaning from the theories in which they are embedded. Conceptual analysis has its limits in the *meta-theoretical divides that plague and enrich social theorising: how to combine individualist and holistic, materialist and idealist ontologies?
Yet, we cannot just pick and choose a type of power analysis, as if such choices were politically innocent. The reason is that some concepts, like power, have a special status in our political discourse. They are used for a variety of purposes. For power, two are particularly important. Power is used in practical contexts in which we are interested in what we can do to others and what others can do to us. It is also important in moral/legal contexts where it functions as an indicator of effective responsibility: if actors could not have done an act (if they had not the capacity to do so), they cannot be found guilty for it. The first indicates the realm of action; power becomes an indicator of politics as the ‘art of the possible’. The second assesses possible blame. Put into a wider frame: power is about a counterfactual, that is, about things which could have been otherwise. Invoking power therefore asks for a justification why things were done the way they were.
Therefore, choosing concepts of power which are relatively narrow diminish the realm where ‘something can be done’ and in which action needs to be justified. This is an important issue when e.g. discussing non-intentional effects. By limiting the practical context to only those actions with which we intend to affect others, we rule out any moral judgments unintended effects; collateral damage, as it were. Leaving out non-intentional power mobilises a status quo research bias and blinds us for the tacit power of the strong. This also applies to the mobilisation of bias, be it more materialist or ideational. Seeing this as ‘systematic luck’, means we ‘have no choice’ but to live with this fateful polity. Power, understood as an indicator for the ‘art of the possible’ is ruled out. This argument can cut both ways, of course, when wider concepts of power suggest realms for action where there are possibly none. The fundamental point is that invoking the presence of power politicises issues.
But power analysis is even more directly political. This results from a curious paradox. Scholars often engage in debates about where power ‘really’ lies, e.g. whether it is rather hard or ‘soft’. By doing this, they must appeal to an underlying idea that we can know this is in a somewhat objective way. Were power measurable, such debates would be quite pointless however. Precisely because power is not as fungible as money and its understanding is to some extent conventional, do observers try to shape the common understanding and fix the meaning what and where power ‘really’ lies. For such meanings have direct political effects on national security and foreign policy doctrines.
References and further reading
Aron, R. (1962) Paix et guerre entre les nations, Paris: Calmann-Lévy.
Ashley, R. (1989) ‘Imposing International Purpose: Notes on a Problematique of Governance’, in E.-O. Czempiel and J. Rosenau (eds) Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s, 251-290, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.
Bourdieu, P. (1992) Language and Symbolic Power, Oxford: Polity Press.
Baldwin, D. (1989) Paradoxes of Power, Oxford: Blackwell.
Caporaso, J. (1978) ‘Dependence, Dependency and Power in the Global System: a Structural and Behavioral Analysis’, International Organization 32, 1: 13-43.
Connolly, W. (1974) The Terms of Political Discourse, Oxford: Martin Robertson.
Dowding, K. (1996) Power, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Gill, S. and D. Law (1989) ‘Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital’, International Studies Quarterly 33, 4: 475-99.
Guzzini, S. (1993) ‘Structural Power: the Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis’, International Organization 47, 3: 443-78.
Keohane, R. and J. Nye (2000) Power and Interdependence, 3rd ed., New York: Longman.
Keohane, R. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Krasner, S. (1985) Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Lukes, S. (1974) Power: A Radical View, London: Macmillan.
Mearsheimer, J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W.W. Norton.
Morriss, P. (2002) Power: A Philosophical Analysis, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Strange, S. (1988) States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy, New York: Basil Blackwell.