| Proliferation of 1990s occurred when nuclear states were disarming SupportiveArgument1 #56166 Several countries developed or accelerated secret nuclear programmes in the mid-1990s when nuclear-weapon States were strongly engaged in nuclear disarmament—unilaterally (France / UK), bilaterally (US / Russia) or multilaterally (indefinite extension of NPT 1995 and signing the CTBT 1996. |
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Author: France TNP 2010
Cited by: David Price 8:08 PM 5 April 2010 GMT
Citerank: (3) 56162Distinguish reactors based on non-proliferating technologyIt is critical to distinguish between the provision of reactors based on non-proliferating technology (light water reactors) and the provision of fuel needed to operate them, from the export of fuel-cycle (enrichment and reprocessing) technologies, which can have both a civilian and military use.109FDEF6, 128341Distinguish reactors based on non-proliferating technologyIt is critical to distinguish between the provision of reactors based on non-proliferating technology (light water reactors) and the provision of fuel needed to operate them, from the export of fuel-cycle (enrichment and reprocessing) technologies, which can have both a civilian and military use.109FDEF6, 128569Proliferation of 1990s occurred when nuclear states were disarmingSeveral countries developed or accelerated secret nuclear programmes in the mid-1990s when nuclear-weapon States were strongly engaged in nuclear disarmament—unilaterally (France / UK), bilaterally (US / Russia) or multilaterally (indefinite extension of NPT 1995 and signing the CTBT 1996.1198CE71
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| Excerpt / Summary Some consider that fresh disarmament efforts are needed to advance in terms of non-proliferation. This approach is debatable. We may wonder if it’s really by eliminating more nuclear weapons that we’ll succeed in convincing countries violating their international obligations to comply with them. Let’s take a look at the facts. It was in the mid-1990s that some countries developed or accelerated clandestine nuclear programmes. Yet, at that same time, nuclear-weapon States were strongly engaged in the nuclear disarmament process and arms control, whether unilaterally (like France and the United Kingdom), bilaterally (like the United States and Russia) or multilaterally (with the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and the signing of the CTBT in 1996). |