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| (3) Blocks the weapons grade plutonium pathway at the Arak reactor Component1 #400328
| - The third way Iran could build a nuclear weapon is by using weapons-grade plutonium. The only site where Iran could accomplish this is the Arak reactor, a heavy-water nuclear reactor. [1]
- Right now, this reactor could be used in a weapons program, but under this deal, the Arak reactor will be redesigned so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium. And all the spent fuel rods (which could also be source material for weapons-grade plutonium) will be sent out of the country as long as this reactor exists.
- What’s more, Iran will not be able to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 15 years.
- That means, because of this deal, Iran will no longer have a source for weapons-grade plutonium.
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+Citations (1) - CitationsAdd new citationList by: CiterankMapLink[1] The Historic Deal that Will Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon
Author: White House
Publication info: 2015 July
Cited by: David Price 11:01 PM 30 July 2015 GMT
Citerank: (7) 400309Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) [5] is a comprehensive agreement on the nuclear program of Iran signed in Vienna on 14 July 2015 between Iran, the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States—plus Germany), and the European Union. [4]959C6EF, 4003151. Deal blocks the four pathways to a nuclear weaponBuilding a nuclear bomb requires either uranium or plutonium. But under the terms of the July 2015 deal, Iran’s four possible ways to leverage those fissile materials are blocked. [1]109FDEF6, 400321(1) Blocks highly enriched Uranium pathways at Natanz & (2) Fordow109FDEF6, 400329(4) Blocks covert attempts to produce fissile materialInternational inspectors will monitor Iran's nuclear program at every single stage.109FDEF6, 4003301. What Iran’s nuclear program would look like without the dealIran has a large stockpile of enriched uranium and nearly 20,000 centrifuges, enough to create 8–10 bombs. If Iran decided to rush to make a bomb without the deal in place, it would take 2–3 months until they had enough weapon-ready uranium (or highly enriched uranium) to build their first nuclear weapon. Left unchecked, that stockpile and that number of centrifuges would grow exponentially, practically guaranteeing that Iran could create a bomb—and create one quickly—if it so chose. [1]8FFB597, 4003312. Iran's commitments under the dealThis deal removes the key elements needed to create a bomb and prolongs Iran’s breakout time from 2-3 months to 1 year or more if Iran broke its commitments. Importantly, Iran won’t garner any new sanctions relief until the IAEA confirms that Iran has followed through with its end of the deal. And should Iran violate any aspect of this deal, the U.N., U.S., and E.U. can snap the sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy back into place. [1]109FDEF6, 4003322. What Iran’s nuclear program will look like under the dealThe deal makes a significant difference to Iran's nuclear program. [1]8FFB597 URL:
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