The Stevenson Argument
"As for (1) [Gunderson's argument that thinking is 'all-purpose' and irreducible to one example], upon which Gunderson expounds in sections (V) and (V1) of his paper, being able to play the imitation game is itself an 'all-purpose' sort of property, which is correctly attributable to something only if that thing possesses a very large range of other properties" (Stevenson, 1976, p. 131).
"For no doubt the general point about the inference from ability to abilities is correct, but the ability to successfully play the imitation game is supposed to be a special, one might say second-order, ability, the possession of which would legitimize inferences to many other abilities" (Stevenson, 1976, p. 132).
John Stevenson (1976) "On the Imitation Game." Philosophia 6:1:131-133.
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