Introspection needs temporal proximity OpposingArgument1 #115990 In contemporary philosophy of mind one of the minimal conditions for a process to qualify as introspective is that of temporal proximity - the experience must be part of your currently ongoing mental life, or the very recent past. |
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Author: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Cited by: Peter Baldwin 4:53 AM 24 August 2011 GMT Citerank: (2) 115852Confirmed by introspectionThe Memory Accretion Hypothesis is confirmed by introspection. Ask youself 'why do I think there is a past?' It is because you remember it. We also remember that the stock of memories is constantly being added to. Furthermore we infer that the process will continue, leading to belief in the future.1198CE71, 115992Current awareness of memoriesWhat we are concerned with here is the current awareness of memories. This is a feature of our currently ongoing mental lives. The current experience of memories is what gives rise to the sense of the flow of time. This point seems to be acknowledged by advocates of the condition (see citation).13EF597B URL:
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Excerpt / Summary The temporal proximity condition: Introspection is a process that generates knowledge, beliefs, or judgments about one's currently ongoing mental life only; or, alternatively (or perhaps in addition) immediately past (or even future) mental life, within a certain narrow temporal window (sometimes called the specious present (see the entry on the experience and perception of time). You may know that you were thinking about Montaigne yesterday during your morning walk, but you cannot know that fact by current introspection alone—though perhaps you can know introspectively that you currently have a vivid memory of having thought about Montaigne. Likewise, you cannot know by introspection alone that you will feel depressed if your favored candidate loses the election in November—though perhaps you can know introspectively what your current attitude is toward the election or what emotion starts to rise in you when you consider the possible outcomes. Whether the target of introspection is best thought of as one's current mental life or one's immediately past mental life may depend on one's model of introspection: On self-detection models of introspection, according to which introspection is a causal process involving the detection of a mental state (see Section 2.2 below), it's natural to suppose that a brief lapse of time will transpire between the occurrence of the mental state that is the introspective target and the final introspective judgment about that state, which invites (but does not strictly imply) the idea that introspective judgments generally pertain to immediately past states. On self-shaping and self-fulfillment models of introspection, according to which introspective judgments create or embed the very state introspected (see Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 below), it seems more natural to think that the target of introspection is one's current mental life or perhaps even (though few philosophers explicitly go so far) the immediate future. |