Claim is unsupported
Clark's reasoning in support of the claim that systematicity is a conceptual fact is unconvincing (see detailed text). Systematicity is an empirical (not a conceptual) issue, and whether connectionists can account for it remains an open question.
The resons Clark gives to support his claim that systematicity is a conceptual fact are unconvincing:

  • thought ascriptions are not necessarily holistic, because "organisms can have individual thoughts involving a host of concepts in the absence of evidence from the versatile deployment of those concepts” (p.39)
  • thought ascriptions do seem to have something to do with in-the-head mental processing.
So it appears that systematicity is an empirical (not a conceptual) issue, and whether the connectionists can account for it remains an open question.

Keith Butler, 1993b.
Immediately related elementsHow this works
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Artificial Intelligence »Artificial Intelligence
Can computers think? [1] »Can computers think? [1]
Yes: connectionist networks can think [5a] »Yes: connectionist networks can think [5a]
The Connectionist Dilemma »The Connectionist Dilemma
Systematicity is a conceptual not empirical law »Systematicity is a conceptual not empirical law
Claim is unsupported
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