Searle commits fallacy of denying the antecedent
Searle's conclusion isn't implied by the premises: "1) if certain brain-process equivalents are present, they produce intentionality; 2) formal computer programs don't have these equivalents. Thus formal computer programs don't have intentionality."
Lawrence Carelton, 1984.

Denying the Antecedent

The fallacy of denying the antecedent is a bad inference of this form:

1) If X, then Y.

2) Not X.
 
Therefore:

3) Not Y.
Immediately related elementsHow this works
-
Artificial Intelligence »Artificial Intelligence
▲
Can computers think? [1] »Can computers think? [1]
▲
Yes: physical symbol systems can think [3] »Yes: physical symbol systems can think [3]
▲
The Chinese Room Argument [4] »The Chinese Room Argument [4]
▲
Understanding arises from right causal powers »Understanding arises from right causal powers
■
Searle commits fallacy of denying the antecedent
●
Carleton misreads Searle »Carleton misreads Searle
+Kommentare (0)
+Verweise (0)
+About