Misunderstands the sense of "right causal powers"
Searle just claims that there is some set of causal powers (brain-based or otherwise) that is necessary for understanding & that formal computer programs lack that set of causal powers.
Searle doesn't claim that anything producing intentionality must be equivalent to a brain.

Karl Pfeifer, 1992.
Immediately related elementsHow this works
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Artificial Intelligence Â»Artificial Intelligence
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Can computers think? [1] Â»Can computers think? [1]
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Yes: physical symbol systems can think [3] Â»Yes: physical symbol systems can think [3]
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The Chinese Room Argument [4] Â»The Chinese Room Argument [4]
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Understanding arises from right causal powers Â»Understanding arises from right causal powers
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Sufficiency doesn't imply necessary powers Â»Sufficiency doesn't imply necessary powers
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Misunderstands the sense of "right causal powers"
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