A dilemma about cognition and intentionality
The internalization reply relies on the notion that cognition and intentionallity are necessarily connected. But this leads to the dilemma described in the Expanded text.
Either, the man engages in cognitive activity without Chinese-speaking intentionality. When he operates the internalized Chinese Room he actively thinks, even though he doesn't understand what the squiggles & squoggles mean. In which case, we can't justifiably deny the presence of some kind of cognition in the internalized Chinese Room.

Or, the man engages in cognitive activity with Chinese-speaking intentionality (e.g. he may know that "Squiggle-squoggle" is generally followed by "squoggle-squoggle"). In which case, that intentionality may carry over to the internalized Chinese Room as well.

In either case, the internalization reply doesn't conclusively refute the idea that machines can think.

Philip Cam, 1990.
Immediately related elementsHow this works
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Artificial Intelligence Â»Artificial Intelligence
Can computers think? [1] Â»Can computers think? [1]
Yes: physical symbol systems can think [3] Â»Yes: physical symbol systems can think [3]
The Chinese Room Argument [4] Â»The Chinese Room Argument [4]
The Systems Reply Â»The Systems Reply
The Internalisation Reply Â»The Internalisation Reply
A dilemma about cognition and intentionality
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