This story begins one year ago when the United States military announced the creation of AFRICOM, a separate command structure to oversee all U.S. military operations in Africa (except Egypt). AFRICOM was meant to provide the military with a more efficient approach to Africa because previous responsibility for the continent had fallen under three separate command structures. People soon realized that AFRICOM stood for more than streamlining responsibilities. Enmeshed in AFRICOM’s DNA from day one is what the Pentagon refers to as “capacity building”: The idea that if the U.S. military can assist African nations build democratic institutions and establish good governance, some of the pockets of poverty and disorder that remain fertile grounds for terrorist groups would disappear. Also, if U.S. soldiers could work with local populations and show their softer side, it may reduce the appeal of extremism and curb Africans’ mistrust of American intentions. U.S. soldiers training African armies is one thing. So is digging wells and vaccinating cattle for villagers. But rumors persisted that the U.S. also wanted to place a second military base on the continent. Eventually the Pentagon admitted it was searching for real estate that would allow it to better serve local soldiers, provide development work and respond quicker to crisis and contingencies. That’s when the AFRICOM program began running into problems. For many African bloggers, a second proposed U.S. military base on the continent raised many red flags. Questions from the blogshpere flew: What exactly are U.S. interests in Africa?

Algeria and Libya separately ruled out hosting the Defense Department's planned Africa Command, known as AFRICOM, and said they were firmly against any of their neighbors doing so either. U.S. diplomats said they were disappointed by the depth of opposition, given that the Bush administration has bolstered ties with both countries on security matters in recent years. Morocco, which has been mentioned as a possible site for the new command and is one of the strongest U.S. allies in the region, didn't roll out the welcome mat, either. After the U.S. delegation visited Rabat, the capital, on June 11, the Moroccan foreign ministry strongly denied a claim by an opposition political party that the kingdom had already offered to host AFRICOM. A ministry statement called the claim "baseless information."

Nigeria voiced its opposition to AFRICOM in September out of fears that AFRICOM would upset the country’s unrivaled influence in the West Africa region. However, Nigeria and the United States have common interests in boosting maritime security in the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea sub-region — a region that supplies the United States with almost 2 million barrels per day of crude oil. Nigeria’s Niger Delta region alone supplies more than half of that amount and is the United States’ fifth-largest oil supplier. Yaradua lifted his government’s opposition to AFRICOM in return for U.S. political support that is expected to be used against his domestic political detractors. At home, opposition political parties are petitioning a constitutionally mandated elections tribunal for fresh elections to replace the April 29 polls which Nigerian opposition parties and international observers criticized as severely flawed.

AFRICOM’s first public links with the West African country of Liberia was through a Washington Post op-ed written by the African- American businessman Robert L. Johnson, "Liberia's Moment of Opportunity." Forcefully endorsing AFRICOM, Johnson urged that it be based in Liberia. Then came an unprecedented allAfrica.com guest column from Liberia’s president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, “AFRICOM Can Help Governments Willing To Help Themselves,” touting AFRICOM’s potential to “help” Africa “develop a stable environment in which civil society can flourish and the quality of life for Africans can be improved.” Despite these high-profile endorsements, the consolidation and expansion of U.S. military power on the African continent is misguided and could lead to disastrous outcomes. Liberia's 26-year descent into chaos started when the Reagan administration prioritized military engagement and funneled military hardware, training, and financing to the regime of the ruthless dictator Samuel K. Doe. This military "aid," seen as “soft power” at that time, built the machinery of repression that led to the deaths of an estimated 250,000 Liberians.