| Weak Anthropic Principle is tautological Einwand1 #115261 A number of philosophers (mentioned in the citation below) have argued that the Weak Anthropic Principle is tautological - as amounting to saying: The fact that we exist implies that the universe satisfies all the necessary conditions for our existence. As such it is devoid of explanatory value. |
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- VerweiseHinzufügenList by: CiterankMapLink[1] Anthropic Explanations in Cosmology
Zitieren: Mosterin, Jesus - Research Professor at the National Research Council of Spain (CSIC)
Zitiert von: Peter Baldwin 4:20 AM 12 August 2011 GMT
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| Auszug - In a nutshell: The fact that we exist implies that the universe satisfies all the necessary conditions for our existence. Or, in probabilistic garments: The conditional probability of the real universe being the the restricted region of the possible-universes space where life is possible, given the fact that we exist, is different (and much higher) than the absolute probability would be in an apriori probability distribution which did not take into account the fact that such things as people and rabbits actually exist.
Gale (1986) stressed that the weak anthropic principle, "even if acceptable, ... appears so weak as to be meaningless. At first glance, it looks either trivial, or tautological, or transcendental, or all three at once." Nevertheless, he though it could function as a heuristic device. Earman (1987), after careful examination, concluded that in the weak anthropic principle "it is hard to find anything stronger than a tautology."
The (weak) anthropic principle is a valid rule of inference, but it is not a physical (or non-physical) explanation of anything. |