There are overriding reasons to regard minds as consistent
Hutton's argument for the inconsistency of mind is flawed (see detailed text).
  • Hutton's probabilistic model of the mind is unrealistic. It holds that we accept or reject propositions independently of each other. This is not so.
  • An inconsistent model of the mind would affirm every proposition, but no mind would do that.
  • We must assume that we are consistent reasoners to be able to start reasoning at all.
John Lucas (1976).
Immediately related elementsHow this works
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Artificial Intelligence »Artificial Intelligence
Are thinking computers mathematically possible? [7] »Are thinking computers mathematically possible? [7]
No: computers are limited by Gödel's theorems »No: computers are limited by Gödel's theorems
The problem of consistency »The problem of consistency
Belief in one's own consistency leads to inconsistency »Belief in one's own consistency leads to inconsistency
There are overriding reasons to regard minds as consistent
John Lucas »John Lucas
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