Belief in one's own consistency leads to inconsistency
Hutton argues that as humans may be inconsistent, we can’t be sure that the Gödel’s theorem can be applied to minds (see detailed text).
1) Probabililstic evidence suggests we have some contradictory beliefs.

2) Rationality demands we take probabilistic evidence seriously.

3) So, rationality demands we think there's some probability we're inconsistent.

4) So, being certain about one's own consistency—as Lucas claims we can be—is inconsistent with rationality.

Anthony Hutton (1976).
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Belief in one's own consistency leads to inconsistency
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