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| Brain doesn't work with instants Einwand1 #114551 Neurological studies show that the brain does not work with instants. It works with an 'extended present' (aka specious present) generally thought to be 2 to 3 seconds duration. Given this, it is feasible for the brains working memory to apprehend memory accretion. See also Julian Barbour citation. | |
+Verweise (2) - VerweiseHinzufĂŒgenList by: CiterankMapLink[1] The Inner Experience of Time
Zitieren: Marc Whittmann - Department of Psychiatry, University of California, San Diego
Zitiert von: Peter Baldwin 6:27 AM 29 July 2011 GMT
Citerank: (3) 109447Psychologically, we inhabit a 'specious present'Psychological and neurological studies suggest that we do not perceive events moment-by-moment but rather integrate them into perceptual units of approximately 2 to 3 seconds duration. This results in successive events forming a perceptual unity that can be apprehended without recourse to memory.959C6EF, 109448Multiple neural clocksModern neurology has failed to identify any single neural clock in the human brain. Current evidence suggests the brain has multiple time-keeping mechanisms, specialized to different durations. One proposed mechanism based on the rate of decay of memories may have some relation to entropy.959C6EF, 114533Some weak evidence for entropy clocksSince Eddington's time extensive neurological and psychological studies have sought to identify time-keeping mechanisms in the brain. Some hypothesized mechanisms are based on the rate of decay of memories, which would be aligned with the direction of increasing entropy (see citation).1198CE71
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| | Auszug - "On a different time scale, a perceptual mechanism seems to exist that integrates separate successive events into a unit or perceptual gestalt (see Poppel 2009). We do not just perceive individual events in isolation, but automatically integrate them into perceptual units with a duration of approximately 2â3 s (Fraisse 1984; Poppel 1997). For example, while listening to a metronome at a moderate speed, we do not hear a train of individual beats, but automatically form perceptual units, such as 1â2â3, 1â2â3, etc. These are mental constructsâphysically speaking, they do not exist. The duration of this temporal integration mechanism, referred to as the subjective present, seems to be limited to 2â3 s (Szelag et al. 1996; Wittmann & Poppel 2000)."
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"The notion that perception and motor behaviour are processed in discrete windows or processing epochs has been conceptualized for some time (White 1963; Poppel 1970; Dehaene 1993; VanRullen & Koch 2003; Fingelkurts & Fingelkurts 2006). These temporal integration units fuse successive events into a unitary experience, âsnapshots of experienceâ or âpsychological presentsâ (Blumenthal 1977), which are characterized by co-temporality, meaning that
events within this time zone have no temporal relationship (Ruhnau 1995). For example, the perception of temporal order of short stimuli in different modalities is only possible if the individual events are separated by at least 20â60 ms (Exner 1875; Hirsh & Sherrick 1961; Kanabus et al. 2002; Fink et al. 2006). f the two events are separated by smaller intervals, an observer is not able to tell which of the two appeared first." |
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