Highly complex machine may not be Gödelizable
A qualitative difference in the way computers think may be introduced when they have advanced to a high enough degree of complexity. Such a highly complex machine may recognise the truth of its own Gödel sentence.
Argument anticipated by John Lucas (1961).
Immediately related elementsHow this works
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Artificial Intelligence »Artificial Intelligence
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Are thinking computers mathematically possible? [7] »Are thinking computers mathematically possible? [7]
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No: computers are limited by Gödel's theorems »No: computers are limited by Gödel's theorems
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Improved machines »Improved machines
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Highly complex machine may not be Gödelizable
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Un-Gödelizable machine wouldn't be a machine »Un-Gödelizable machine wouldn't be a machine
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