Randomness eliminates moral responsibility
Randomness and moral responsibility are incompatible. We cannot be morally responsible for what happens randomly any more than we can be morally responsible for what is predetermined.
The Ayer Argument
"[The reason we want] to show that men are capable of acting freely [is] in order to infer that they can be morally responsible for what they do. But if it is a matter of pure chance that a man should act in one way rather than another...he can hardly be responsible." (A. Ayer, 1954, p. 275; as quoted in Copeland.)
Copeland provides the following expanded paraphrase of Ayer's argument:
"'Misappropriate the word free and apply it to randomly made choices if you will,' goes the argument. 'There is nothing to stop you using words in whatever way you please. But be warned that no sensible person will want to follow you in your new usage. An agent cannot be held responsible for something that is done purely by accident; so anyone who fell in with your new usage would have to allow that agents are not responsible for their freely chosen actions. But this is as absurd as if you had misappropriated the word safe to apply to buildings that it is hazardous to enter. Just as our main concern in enquiring whether a building is safe is to ascertain whether it can be entered without risk, so our main concern in enquiring whether an action was freely chosen is to establish whether or not the agent is to be held responsible for the action.'" (J. Copeland, 1993)
References
Ayer, A. J. 1954. Philosophical Essays. London: Macmillan.
Copeland, Jack. 1993. Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.