The Pseudorealisation Fallacy
Fantastic realisations of the computational theory of mind, such as Searle's man in a Chinese Room, are irrelevant to empirical psychology. Relevant realisations are subject to empirical constraints; they can't be pseudorealisations.
For instance, although by some stretch the imagination is stomach can be thought of as an information processor, such a realisation is likely to be ad hoc. The stomach must consistently exhibit the kind of processing specified by information processing psychology. One can't just pick out a new section of the stomach each time a new computational state is required.
James Moor, 1988.
"the empirical content of a theory limits the kinds of realizations which are possible." (p. 49)
Note: for more multiple realisability arguments, see the "Is a brain a computer?" arguments on Map 1, the "Can functional states generate consciousness?" arguments on Map 6, and sidebar, "Formal systems: an overview" on Map 7.