Searle commits fallacy of denying the antecedent

Searle's conclusion isn't implied by the premises: "1) if certain brain-process equivalents are present, they produce intentionality; 2) formal computer programs don't have these equivalents. Thus formal computer programs don't have intentionality."

Lawrence Carelton, 1984.

Denying the Antecedent

The fallacy of denying the antecedent is a bad inference of this form:

1) If X, then Y.

2) Not X.
 
Therefore:

3) Not Y.
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