comments

Understanding arises from right causal powers

Systems capable of semantic understanding and intentionality must have at least the same causal powers as brains. Brains have sufficient causal powers to produce understanding: it's an open empirical question whether other materials (eg silicon) do.

John Searle 1980a, 1980b, 1990b.



RELATED ARTICLESExplain
⌅
Artificial Intelligence
⌃
Can computers think? [1]
⌃
Yes: physical symbol systems can think [3]
⌃
The Chinese Room Argument [4]
■
Understanding arises from right causal powers
↳
Biological Naturalism
↳
Brain's causal powers reproduced by a computer
↳
Chinese Room style argument shows causal powers insufficient
↳
Programming may be necessary to understanding
↳
Searle commits fallacy of denying the antecedent
↳
Sufficiency doesn't imply necessary powers
⇥
John Searle
□
The Syntax-Semantics Barrier
□
Only minds are intrinsically intentional
□
Can't process symbols predicationally or oppositionally
□
Chinese Room refutes strong AI not weak AI
□
The Combination Reply
□
The Systems Reply
□
Robot reply: Robots can think
□
The Brain Simulator Reply
□
The Many Mansions Reply
□
The Pseudorealisation Fallacy
□
Searle's Chinese Room is trapped in a dilemma
□
Chinese Room more than a simulation
□
Man in Chinese Room doesn't instantiate a progam
□
Chinese-speaking too limited a counterexample
□
The Chinese Room makes a modularity assumption
□
Man in Room understands some Chinese questions
□
The Chinese Room argument is circular
□
There are questions the Chinese Room can't answer
□
Graph of this discussion
Enter the title of your article


Enter a short (max 500 characters) summation of your article
Enter the main body of your article
Lock
+Comments (0)
+Citations (0)
+About
Enter comment

Select article text to quote
welcome text

First name   Last name 

Email

Skip