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Only minds are intrinsically intentional

Mental states alone are intrinsically intentional. Computational systems are only intentional relative to some observer who treats them "as if" they had intentional states.

John Searle 1980a, 1980b, 1990b.

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Only minds are intrinsically intentional
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Intentionality implies self-awareness and drive
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John Searle
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The Many Mansions Reply
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The Pseudorealisation Fallacy
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Chinese Room more than a simulation
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Chinese-speaking too limited a counterexample
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Man in Room understands some Chinese questions
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The Chinese Room argument is circular
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There are questions the Chinese Room can't answer
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