2. NPT RevCon 2010 – Conclusions

Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions from NPT RevCon 2010.

I. Nuclear Disarmament

In pursuit of the full, effective and urgent implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and building upon the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the Conference agrees on the following Action Plan on nuclear disarmament which includes concrete steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapons:

A. Principles and Objectives

i. The Conference resolves to seek a safer world for all and to achieve the peace and security. of a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the objectives of the Treaty.

ii. The Conference reaffirms the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI.

iii. The Conference reaffirms the continued validity of the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

iv. The Conference reaffirms that significant steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament should promote international stability, peace and security, and be based on the principle of increased and undiminished security for all.

The Conference expresses its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, and reaffirms the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.

vi. The Conference affirms the vital importance of universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and calls on all States not party to the Treaty to accede as non-nuclear-weapon States to the Treaty promptly and without any conditions, and to commit to achieving the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons, and calls upon States to promote universal adherence to the Treaty, and not to undertake any actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.

The Conference resolves that:

> Action 1: All States parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

> Action 2: All States parties commit to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations.

B. Disarmament of Nuclear Weapons

The Conference reaffirms the urgent need for the nuclear-weapon States to implement the steps leading to nuclear disarmament agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and security, and based on the principle of undiminished and increased security for all.

ii. The Conference affirms the need for the nuclear-weapon States to reduce and eliminate all types of their nuclear weapons and encourages in particular those States ,with the largest nuclear arsenals to lead efforts in this regard.

iii. The Conference calls on all Nuclear Weapons States to undertake concrete disarmament efforts and affirms that all States need to make special efforts to establish the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons. The Conference notes the Five-Point Proposal for Nuclear Disarmament of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which proposes inter alia consideration of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention or agreement on a framework of separate mutually reinforcing instruments, backed by a strong system of verification.

iv. The Conference recognizes the legitimate interests of non-nuclear-weapon States in the constraining by the nuclear weapon States of the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.

The Conference resolves that:

> Action 3: In implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States commit to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional, and multilateral measures.

> Action 4: The Russian Federation and the United States of America commit to seek the early entry-into-force and full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and are encouraged to continue discussions on follow-on measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals.

> Action 5: The nuclear-weapon States commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security. To this end, they are called upon to promptly engage with a view to inter alia:

a. rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons, as identified in Action 3;

b. address the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process;

c. to further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies;

d. discuss policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons;

e. consider the legitimate interest of non-nuclear weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security;

f. reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and

g. further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence.

The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to report the above undertakings to the Preparatory Committee at 2014. The 2015 Review Conference will take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of Article VI.

> Action 6: All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced Programme of Work.

C. Security Assurances

The Conference reaffirms and recognizes that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and the legitimate interest of non-nuclear weapon States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States which could strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

ii. The Conference recalls the United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995) noting the unilateral statements by each of the nuclear-weapon States, in which they give conditional or unconditional security assurances against the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty and the relevant protocols established pursuant to nuclear weapons free zones recognizing that the treaty-based security assurances are available to such zones.

Without prejudice to efforts within the NPT the Conference resolves that:

> Action 7: All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced Programme of Work, immediately begin discussion of effective international arrangements to assure nonnuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to discuss substantively, without limitation, with a- view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument. The Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

> Action 8: All nuclear-weapon States commit to fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances. Those nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so are encouraged to extend security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

> Action 9: The establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, where appropriate, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, is encouraged. All concerned States are encouraged to ratify the nuclear-weapon-free, zone treaties and their relevant protocols, and to constructively consult and cooperate to bring about the entry-into-force of the relevant legally binding protocols of all such nuclear-weapon-free zones treaties which include negative security assurances. The concerned States are encouraged to review any related reservations.

D. Nuclear Testing

The Conference recognizes that the cessation of all nuclear test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects.

ii. The Conference reaffirms the vital importance of the entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) as a core element of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, as well as the determination of the nuclear-weapon. States to abide by their respective moratoria on nuclear test explosions pending the entry-into-force of the CTBT.

The Conference resolves that:

> Action 10: All nuclear-weapons States undertake to ratify the CTBT with all expediency, noting that positive decisions by nuclear-weapon States would have the beneficial impact towards the ratification of the CTBT, and that nuclear-weapon States have the special responsibility to encourage Annex 2 countries in particular those which have not acceded to the NPT and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify.

> Action 11: Pending the entry-into-force of the CTBT, all States commit to refrain from nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, the use of new nuclear weapons technologies and from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT, and all existing moratoria on nuclear weapon test explosions should be maintained.

> Action 12: All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty recognise the contribution of the Conferences on Facilitating the Entry-into-Force of the CTBT and of the measures adopted by consensus at the September 2009 Conference, and commit to report at the 2011 Conference on progress made towards the urgent entry-into-force of the CTBT.

> Action 13: All States that have ratified the CTBT undertake to promote the entryinto-force of, and implementation of, the CTBT at national, regional and global levels.

> Action 14: The CTBTO Preparatory Commission is to be encouraged to fully. develop the CTBT verification regime, including early completion and provisional operationalisation of the International Monitoring System in accordance with the mandate of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation, which should, upon entry-into-force of the CTBT, serve as an effective, reliable, participatory and non-discriminatory verification system with global reach, and provide assurance of compliance with the CTBT.

E. Fissile Materials

i. The Conference reaffirms the urgent necessity of negotiating and bringing to a conclusion a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The Conference resolves that:

> Action 15: All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced Programme of Work, immediately begin negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the Report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein. Also in this respect, the Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

> Action 16: The nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to commit to declare, as appropriate, to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

> Action 17: In the context of Action 16, all States are encouraged to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of the IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes.

> Action 18: All States that have not yet done so are encouraged to initiate a process towards the dismantling or conversion for peaceful uses of facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

F. Other Measures in Support of Nuclear Disarmament

The Conference recognises that nuclear disarmament and achieving the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons will require openness and co-operation, and affirms the importance of enhanced confidence through increased transparency and effective verification.

The Conference resolves that:

> Action 19: All States agree on the importance of supporting cooperation among governments, the United Nations, other international and regional organisations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency, and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament.

> Action 20: States parties should submit regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Treaty, on the implementation of this Action Plan, as well as of article VI, paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

> Action 21: As a confidence building measure all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security. The Secretary-General is invited to establish a publicly-accessible repository which shall include the information provided by the nuclear-weapon States.

> Action 22: All States are encouraged to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/57/124) regarding the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, in order to advance the goals of the Treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

II. Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The Conference recalls and reaffirms the decisions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", noting paragraph 1 of the principles and the elements relevant to article III of the Treaty, in particular paragraphs 9-13 and 17-19, and to article VII, in particular paragraphs 5-7. It also recalls and reaffirms the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at that Conference. The Conference also recalls and reaffirms the outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

> Action 23: The Conference calls upon all States parties to exert all efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty, and not to undertake any actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.

> Action 24: The Conference re-endorses the call by previous Review Conferences for the application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of Article III of the Treaty.

> Action 25: The Conference, noting that 18 States parties to the Treaty have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, urges them to do so as soon as possible and without further delay.

> Action 26: The conference underscores the importance in complying with the nonproliferation obligations, addressing all compliance matters in order to uphold the treaty's integrity and the authority of the safeguards system.

> Action 27: The Conference underscores the importance of resolving all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in full conformity with the IAEA statute and Member States' respective legal obligations. In this regard, the Conference calls upon Member States to extend their cooperation to the Agency.

> Action 28: The Conference encourages all States parties which have not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force.

> Action 29: The Conference encourages IAEA to further facilitate and assist the States parties in the conclusion and entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The Conference calls on States parties to consider specific measures that would promote the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreements.

> Action 30: The Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements, in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of the IAEA resources and stresses that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

> Action 31: The Conference encourages all States parties with small quantities protocols which have not yet done so to amend or rescind them, as appropriate, as soon as possible.

> Action 32: The Conference recommends that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA's safeguards should be supported and implemented.

> Action 33: The Conference calls upon all States parties to ensure that the IAEA continue to have all political, technical and financial support so that the IAEA is able to effectively meet its responsibility to apply safeguards as required by Article III of the Treaty.

> Action 34: The Conference encourages States parties, within the framework of IAEA statutes to further develop a robust, flexible, adaptive and cost-effective international technology base for advanced safeguards through cooperation among Member States and with the IAEA.

> Action 35: The Conference urges all States parties to ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devises and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, as well as the decision on principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference.

> Action 36: The Conference encourages States parties to make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls.

> Action 37: The Conference encourages States parties to consider whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations in making nuclear export decisions.

> Action 38: The Conference calls upon all State parties, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate right of all State parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for'peaceful purposes.

> Action 39: States parties are encouraged to facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and materials, and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty and eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.

> Action 40: The Conference encourages all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities.

> Action 41: The Conference encourages all States parties to apply, as appropriate, the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4(Corrected)) and other relevant international instruments at the earliest possible date.

> Action 42: The Conference calls on all States parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ratify the amendment to the Convention as soon as possible and encourages them to act in accordance with the objectives and the purpose of the amendment until such time as it enters into force. The Conference also encourages on all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention and adopt the amendment as soon as possible.

> Action 43: The Conference urges all States parties to implement the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Guidelines on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2004.

> Action 44: The Conference calls upon all States parties to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations and calls upon those States parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in this regard. The Conference also calls upon States parties to establish and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations.

> Action 45: The Conference encourages all States parties that have not yet done so to become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible.

> Action 46: The Conference encourages the IAEA to continue to assist the States parties in strengthening their national regulatory controls of nuclear material, including the establishment and maintenance of the State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, as well as systems on regional level. The Conference calls upon IAEA member States to broaden their support for the relevant IAEA programmes.

III. Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

The Conference re-affirms that the Treaty fosters the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place. The Conference calls upon States parties to act in conformity with all the provisions of the Treaty and to:

> Action 47: respect each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies;

> Action 48: undertake to facilitate, and reaffirm the right of States parties to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

> Action 49: cooperate with other States parties or international organisations in the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world;

> Action 50: give preferential treatment to the non-nuclear weapons States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account;

> Action 51: facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with articles I, II, III, and IV of the Treaty, and eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty;

> Action 52: continue efforts, in the IAEA, to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA's technical cooperation programme;

> Action 53: strengthen the IAEA technical cooperation programme in assisting ' developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

> Action 54: make every effort and to take practical steps to ensure that the IAEA's resources for technical cooperation activities are sufficient, assured and predictable;

> Action 55: encourage all States in a position to do so to make additional contributions to the initiative designed to raise 100 million dollars over the next five years as extra-budgetary contributions to IAEA activities, while welcoming the contributions already pledged by countries and groups of countries in support of IAEA activities;

> Action 56: encourage national, bilateral and international efforts to train the necessary skilled workforce needed to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

> Action 57: ensure that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by commitments to and ongoing implementation of safeguards as well as appropriate and effective levels of safety and security, consistent with States' national legislation and respective international obligations;

> Action 58: continue' to discuss further, in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner under the auspices of IAEA or regional fora, the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the possibilities to create mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply, as well as possible schemes dealing with the back-end of the fuel cycle without affecting rights under the Treaty and without prejudice to national fuel cycle policies, while tackling the technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding these issues, including in this regard the requirement of IAEA full scope safeguards;

> Action 59: consider to become party, if not yet have done so, to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), and to ratify its amendment so that it may enter into force at an early date;

> Action 60: promote the sharing of best practices in the area of nuclear safety and security, including through dialogue with the nuclear industry and the private sector, as appropriate;

> Action 61: encourage States concerned, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize highly enriched uranium in civilian stocks and use, where technically and economically feasible;

> Action 62: transport radioactive materials consistent with relevant international standards of safety, security and environmental protection, and to continue communication between shipping and coastal states for the purpose of confidence building and addressing concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness;

> Action 63: put in force a civil nuclear liability regime by becoming' party to relevant international instruments or adopting suitable national legislation, based upon the principles established by the main pertinent international instruments.

> Action 64: The Conference calls upon all states to abide by the decision adopted by consensus at the IAEA General Conference on 18 September 2009 on "Prohibition. of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction".

IV. The Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East

1. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalls the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. The Conference stresses that the Resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are achieved. The Resolution, which was co-sponsored by the depositary States of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America), is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. States Parties renew their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation.

2. The Conference reaffirms its endorsement of the aims and objectives of the Middle East Peace Process and recognises that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction.

3. The Conference takes note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

4. The Conference regrets that little progress' has been achieved towards the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

5. The Conference recalls the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Conference reaffirms the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty. The Conference calls on all States in the Middle East that have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date.

6. The Conference stresses the necessity of strict adherence by all States Parties to their obligations and commitments under the Treaty. The Conference urges all States in the region to take relevant steps and confidence building measures to contribute to the realisation of the objectives of the 1995 Resolution and calls upon all States to refrain from undertaking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective.

7. The Conference emphasises the importance of a process leading to full implementation of the 1995 Resolution. To this end, the Conference endorses the following practical steps:

(a) The UN Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Middle East Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, will convene a Conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States. The 2012 Conference shall take as its terms of reference the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

(b) Appointment by the UN Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Middle East Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, of a Facilitator, with a mandate to support implementation of the 1995 Resolution by conducting consultations with the States of the region in that regard and undertaking preparations for the convening of the 2012 Conference. The Facilitator will also assist in implementation of follow-on steps agreed by the participating regional States at the 2012 Conference. The Facilitator will report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings.

(c) Designation by the UN Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Middle East Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, of a host Government for the 2012 Conference.

(d) Additional steps aimed at supporting the implementation of the Resolution, including that the IAEA, OPCW and other relevant international organisations be requested to prepare background documentation for the 2012 Conference regarding modalities for a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, taking into account work previously undertaken and experience gained.

(e) Consideration of all offers aimed at supporting the implementation of the Resolution, including the offer of the European Union to host a follow-on seminar to that organized in June 2008.

8. The Conference emphasises the requirement of maintaining parallel progress, in substance and timing, in the process leading to achieving total and complete elimination of all WM> in the region, nuclear, chemical and biological.

9. The Conference reaffirms that all States Parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and the States in the region, should continue to report on steps taken to implement the Resolution, through the United Nations Secretariat, to the President of the 2015 Review Conference, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference.

10. The Conference further recognises the important role played by civil society in contributing to the implementation of the Resolution and encourages all efforts in this regard.

Other regional issue

1. The Conference strongly urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fulfil the commitments under the Six-Party Talks, including the complete and verifiable abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in accordance with the September 2005 Joint Statement, and urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return, at an early date, to the Treaty and to its adherence with its IAEA safeguards agreement. The Conference also calls on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and all States parties to fully implement all relevant nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament obligations. The Conference reaffirms its firm support for the Six-Party Talks and remains determined to achieve the satisfactory and comprehensive resolution to the issues involved through diplomatic means.

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