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Critical mass unlikely to developIt's unliikely that a critical mass of Radicalized American Muslims will form a homegrown Al Qaeda. Aired January 21, 2010 - 15:00:00 ET THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED. "...AMANPOUR: And joining me now, the head of the Al Qaida monitoring unit at the U.N., Richard Barrett. He's a former head of counterterrorism for Britain's overseas intelligence service, MI6.
Welcome, Mr. Barrett.
RICHARD BARRETT, FORMER HEAD OF COUNTERTERRORISM FOR MI6: Thank you.
AMANPOUR: When you listen to that and you see that the husband was on the Internet writing these blogs, did they miss -- did they miss that? Should they have been able to track that?
BARRETT: No, I shouldn't have -- shouldn't have thought they missed that at all. I think it's incredibly difficult to penetrate the inner circles of the Al Qaida leadership. And clearly, you know, they have a very good vetting system, I guess, in the areas that they operate. They know all the people coming in. They know who the strangers are and so on.
So if you want to get anybody into those circles, of course, they have to look very genuine. And therefore, I would imagine that the handlers of Mr. al-Balawi were -- were quite ready for him to promote his jihad blogging and so on to -- to establish himself as a person they could trust.
AMANPOUR: So what does this say, the fact that he did commit bad -- the worst attack on the CIA in 25 years since what happened in Lebanon in 1983? What does it say about the strength of Al Qaida, the Taliban, the nexus between Al Qaida and the Taliban?
BARRETT: Well, I think that particular incident shows how difficult it is to penetrate the leadership, but it doesn't necessarily show how strong they are. I mean, obviously, it was a devastating attack for the CIA and for the efforts against the Taliban Al Qaida more generally, because it is very much based on intelligence.
AMANPOUR: But you don't think it shows that they're any stronger?
BARRETT: No, I think we have to distinguish also between Taliban and Al Qaida. I think Taliban are probably stronger now than they were two or three years ago, but I don't think that's necessarily true for Al Qaida.
AMANPOUR: Do you not think that was a joint Al Qaida-Taliban operation?
BARRETT: It seems to me that, well, we looked at the video that al- Balawi made his sort of testimony, and there was a quotation from it in your clip just then. And there he was sitting next to Hakimullah Mehsud, who's the leader of the Pakistan Taliban.
The Pakistan Taliban is separate from the Afghan Taliban. And -- but they join over in certain respects, for example, through the Haqqani group. And we believe that the Haqqani group were also involved, because the attack took place in an area of Afghanistan which has been much influenced by Haqqani.
AMANPOUR: So we're going to go to a map in a second and have you show us, but what we really want to ask you is, what are you tracking? What are you monitoring? What is happening in this region, in terms of the spread or the growth of Al Qaida or -- or likeminded or affiliates?
BARRETT: Sure. What we're trying to do is to track the threat from Al Qaida generally, whether it's off your map, for example, in Southeast Asia, or in particular, you know, in this sort of heartland of Afghanistan, Pakistan. Just, you know, particularly sort of in the border area, I would say there. And that is, of course, the central area for Al Qaida, still where the senior leadership is. And, of course, the Taliban, too, has been, you know, particularly strong in this border area around that -- that -- that area.
But, also, of course, the Al Qaida leadership in the Afghanistan- Pakistan border area is trying to influence people elsewhere to sort of follow their ideology, to follow their objectives.
AMANPOUR: And how successful -- I mean, we saw the Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula now has a big profile because of what happened on Christmas Day, the failed airline bombing. So how much of a profile, how - - how strong are they? I know you said they're not strong. But what do you -- what do you sort of assess? Are they a fragmented, weak organization or a strongly integrated network? Which is closest to reality of those descriptions?
BARRETT: Well, there's no doubt that the leadership would like it to be a properly networked organization, accepting strategic direction from themselves. But, in fact, the local groups have rather broken away from the sort of overall Al Qaida strategy, which you remember Osama bin Laden tried to establish in the 1990s when he formed Al Qaida.
[15:20:00]
And now, as you mentioned, you know, groups in Yemen here are very much strengthened recently because Saudi Arabia has been so successful in driving Al Qaida's supporters out of the country, and they've crossed over into Yemen. Many of them have joined up. And we saw in January of last year how the Al Qaida in Yemen joined in a sort of announcing video with the Al Qaida in Saudi Arabia to make this rather more effective organization.
But their interests are still, in my opinion, rather regional. Their main objectives are to hit targets in Saudi Arabia, to hit targets in Yemen, particularly, I would say, in Saudi Arabia. But the leadership in the Afghanistan-Pakistan area is trying to persuade them to do more, to attack Western targets, and so on, and hence you see this attempt on the 25th of December.
AMANPOUR: And do you think that they're able to pull off another 9/11?
BARRETT: Well, 9/11 was a magnificent operation. You know, I mean, they had everything going for them, not only the sort of unpreparedness, if you like, and the clear, blue sky from which these airplanes emerged. It wouldn't have been the same on the last 9/11, because it was a rather murky day.
They had everything going for them, and they had tremendous organization without very much attention. I mean, we were all looking at Al Qaida, but with nothing like the resources that are devoted today.
AMANPOUR: And yet you have all been looking at it with much more resources since 9/11 and there was this failure to connect the intelligence dots, which led to the Nigerian getting on with his underpants bomb.
BARRETT: Yes, of course, there are so many dots, aren't there? And it's always easy with hindsight to say which dots you should have connected. I mean, clearly there were issues there that could have been put together, and something could have been done to prevent this man from mounting his attack.
But I think we have to accept in the long term that there are going to be people like this trying to mount attacks, and some of them will be successful, you know? It's an appalling thing to have to absorb, but I think it will happen. And...
AMANPOUR: Do you think some of them will inevitably get through -- get through the net?
BARRETT: Yeah, I think some -- some will get through the net. I mean, the -- if you remember, in August of last year, the attempt on Prince Muhammad bin Nayef in Saudi Arabia, the very similar mechanism, very similar group preparing it, probably the same people in charge that was very nearly successful.
AMANPOUR: The latest intelligence or the latest analysis of the movement of Al Qaida seems to suggest that militants could spring up from right here inside the United States, that radicalized American Muslims or others could start a sort of homegrown Al Qaida or affiliate here. Do you -- do you subscribe to that theory?
BARRETT: Well, there have been incidents, haven't there, which suggest that there are people in the United States who may adopt this sort of extremist and violent sort of political...
AMANPOUR: But a critical mass or something really to be worried about right now? Or is it loan individuals?
BARRETT: Well, I would agree. I think it's loan individuals. I don't think there is this critical mass. And I think that as soon as people try to start networking into groups, of course, they're much more susceptible to intelligence penetration and discovery.
AMANPOUR: And what do you think about this latest report that some three dozen or so were radicalized in prison here in the United States, Americans, and have gone abroad, perhaps to Yemen, and who knows to do what and where they are?
BARRETT: Yes, I saw the report. And, of course, radicalization in prison is a big issue, particularly in Europe and elsewhere, not so much that I've heard in the United States, though we have had incidences...
(CROSSTALK)
AMANPOUR: So does that surprise you?
BARRETT: No, because I think that people in prison often are ready to adopt some sort of radical ideology which gives sort of simple solutions to their complex problems. You know, it's quite attractive for -- to belong to a gang, you know, for protection within prison, and stuff like that, but it doesn't necessarily mean to say they go on to commit terrorist acts, of course. I mean, being radical in itself isn't particularly a bad thing. But being...
(CROSSTALK)
AMANPOUR: ... all the way to Yemen?
BARRETT: Yeah, I mean, Yemen's a beautiful country. And I can see lots of reasons for people to go to Yemen.
AMANPOUR: Well, yeah. But you -- but you -- I know, but you're saying that the Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, which is basically based there, is the latest big threat.
BARRETT: I think it is. And I think, you know, we've also seen Americans go to Somalia, for example, to join the fighting in Somalia. And I don't at all rule out that some of these people may get radicalized and join the fighting in Yemen, as well.
AMANPOUR: What do you think motivates the latest recruits, the newest post-9/11 recruits?
BARRETT: That's interesting, because, of course, 9/11 already -- you know, nine years ago. And I think that the people now who are being recruited are probably in the sort of 16- to 22-year-old range. And, of course, they weren't very old at that time. You know, the 7 to 13 or so, and 9/11 wouldn't have had such an impact on them.
So I think the motivation for these new recruits is, you know, being wrapped up in this sort of single narrative, as we call it, that Al Qaida puts out, that whatever problems you have, whether it's at school or in society or the way that you're treated perhaps by the authorities or the fact you haven't got a job, all that's part of a much broader conspiracy against your faith and your community and, therefore, you should do something to combat that.
AMANPOUR: We'll keep watching, keep monitoring what you're doing, as well. Thank you, Richard Barrett, for joining us.
BARRETT: Pleasure".
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