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Jerry Fodor
Arguments advanced by Jerry Fodor.
RELATED ARTICLES
Explain
⌅
Artificial Intelligence
Artificial Intelligence☜A collaboratively editable version of Robert Horns brilliant and pioneering debate map Can Computers Think?—exploring 50 years of philosophical argument about the possibility of computer thought.☜F1CEB7
⌃
Protagonists
Protagonists☜The contributions of over 300 protagonists can be explored via a surname search, or using the growing list developing here.☜D3B8AB
■
Jerry Fodor
Jerry Fodor☜Arguments advanced by Jerry Fodor.☜D3B8AB
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Unconscious and conscious states aren't identical
Unconscious and conscious states aren't identical☜Searle presupposes that any given unconscious state is identical to its conscious form. But identity is partly determined by causal powers, and the causal powers of an unconscious state are different from the causal powers of a conscious state.☜FFFACD
⇤
The consciousness-pill thought experiment
The consciousness-pill thought experiment ☜The connection principle isnt controversial, even in an extreme form. Its just an interesting possibility—and because the possibility isnt controversial, theres nothing wrong with Searles account.☜FFFACD
⇤
Implementable in functional system
Implementable in functional system☜Properly organized functional states generate consciousness. Such organization exists in the brain and can be built into computers as well.☜FFFACD
⇤
Computationalism
Computationalism☜Computationalism locates the mental in abstract computational states embedded in a complex network of inputs, outputs, and other mental states: machine-state functionalism locates it in the various possible machine states that could implement them. ☜FFFACD
⇤
Brain-style modelling can be misleading
Brain-style modelling can be misleading ☜Basing psychological theories on facts about the brain can be misleading. Neural inspiration seems useful, but its led to a revival of such weak psychological theories as: associationism; microfeature analysis; and statistically based learning.☜FFFACD
⇤
Facts about the brain may be irrelevant
Facts about the brain may be irrelevant☜Structures at different levels of organisation are often dissimilar. Thinking may have little in common with the neural structures its implemented in. Basing a theory of cognitive architecture on a theory about the brain requires care.☜FFFACD
⇤
The Connectionist Dilemma
The Connectionist Dilemma☜The connectionist approach to cognitive science is impaled on the horns of a dilemma: it is either inadequate as a theory of mind, or else it is an implementation of the classical architecture (see detailed text).☜FFFACD
⇤
Connectionism is associationism
Connectionism is associationism☜Processing units in a connectionist network are connected by associative links. Associationist theories cant account for systematicity and related phenomena: symbolic AI can via structured representations and structure sensitive thought processes.☜FFFACD
⇤
Constituents lack causal powers
Constituents lack causal powers☜The parts of a tensor product representation are not explicitly contained or tokened within it—the parts have no independent status in the complex representation. As such, tensor product constituents lack individual causal powers.☜FFFACD
⇤
The Regress of Contexts
The Regress of Contexts ☜Smolenskys coffee representation leads to an infinite regress of representations. Coffee depends on a higher order representation of cup-with-coffee. But cup-with-coffee presumably depends on another (eg cup-with-coffee-on-the table). And so on.☜FFFACD
⇤
Yes: physical symbol systems can think [3]
Yes: physical symbol systems can think [3]☜Thinking is a rule governed manipulation of symbolic representational structures. In humans, symbol systems are instantiated in the brain, but the same symbol systems can also be instantiated in a computer. ☜FFFACD
⇤
Symbol structures can be distributed
Symbol structures can be distributed☜A classicial symbol processor can be physically distributed in memory, and can thereby exhibit graceful degradation. So distributed systems like connectionist networks dont have any principled advatange over physical symbol systems.☜FFFACD
⇤
The 100-step constraint
The 100-step constraint☜Alogrithms modelling cognitive processes must meet the 100-step constraint for performing complex tasks imposed by the brains timescale. Classical sequential algorithms, which run in millions of time-steps now, seem unlikely to meet the constraint.☜FFFACD
⇤
Symbol processing can take place in parallel
Symbol processing can take place in parallel☜A classical system can be implemented in a parallel architecture: eg by executing multiple symbolic processes at the same time. So parallel processing systems, like connectionist networks, have no principled advantage over classical symbol systems.☜FFFACD
⇤
The language of thought
The language of thought☜The language of thoughts a formal language that mental processes operate on; with a combinatorial syntax and semantics. Sentences are generated from combinations of words: complex mental representations from combinations of simpler representations.☜FFFACD
⇤
Affordances are trivial
Affordances are trivial☜Affordances are just another name for whatever it is in the environment that makes an organism respond as it does. But such a notion cant provide a substantial explanation of perception and adds nothing new to our knowledge of perception mechanism☜FFFACD
⇤
Classicists aren't committed to explicit rules
Classicists aren't committed to explicit rules☜The possibility of implicit rules doesnt argue against the classical symbolic framework, because theres a body of work within the classicist camp that shows how implicit rules can be modeled.☜FFFACD
⇤
Proper instantiations require the right causal connections
Proper instantiations require the right causal connections☜The definition of instantiation used in the Chinese Room argmument isnt sufficiently rich for the Chinese Room to be considered as an instantiation of a program. ☜FFFACD
⇤
Causal connection to world is essential to meaning
Causal connection to world is essential to meaning☜Mental states become meaningful— intentional or semantic—through causal connecton via the senses to, and ability to act on, the external world. Searle doesnt show that no causal connection could ever produce meaning at all, just that his man cant.☜FFFACD
⇤
Turing Test only provides partial evidence
Turing Test only provides partial evidence☜The Turing Test only provides partial, inductive evidence of intelligence, and passing the test does not guarantee successful simulation of human behaviour. Moreover, any given Turing test provides only a finite sample of a test takers repertoire.☜FFFACD
⇥
Jerry Fodor
Jerry Fodor☜Arguments advanced by Jerry Fodor.☜FFFACD
⇥
Jerry Fodor
Jerry Fodor☜Arguments advanced by Jerry Fodor.☜FFFACD
□
Alan Turing
Alan Turing☜Arguments advanced by Alan Turing.☜D3B8AB
□
Daniel Dennett
Daniel Dennett☜Arguments advanced by Daniel Dennett.☜D3B8AB
□
David Chalmers
David Chalmers☜Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and director of the Centre for Consciousness at ANU, and Professor of Philosophy and co-director of the Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness at NYU.☜D3B8AB
□
David Cole
David Cole☜Arguments advanced by David Cole.☜D3B8AB
□
David Rumelhart
David Rumelhart☜Arguments advanced by David Rumelhart.☜D3B8AB
□
Douglas Hofstadter
Douglas Hofstadter☜Arguments advanced by Douglas Hofstadter.☜D3B8AB
□
George Lakoff
George Lakoff☜Arguments advanced by George Lakoff.☜D3B8AB
□
Georges Rey
Georges Rey☜Arguments advanced by Georges Rey.☜D3B8AB
□
Herbert Simon
Herbert Simon☜Arguments advanced by Herbert Simon.☜D3B8AB
□
Hilary Putnam
Hilary Putnam☜Arguments advanced by Hilary Putnam.☜D3B8AB
□
Hubert Dreyfus
Hubert Dreyfus☜Arguments advanced by Hubert Dreyfus.☜D3B8AB
□
Hugh Loebner
Hugh Loebner☜Arguments advanced by Hugh Loebner.☜D3B8AB
□
Jack Copeland
Jack Copeland☜Arguments advanced by Jack Copeland.☜D3B8AB
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James McClelland
James McClelland☜Arguments advanced by James McClelland.☜D3B8AB
□
James Moor
James Moor☜Arguments advanced by James Moor.☜D3B8AB
□
John Lucas
John Lucas☜Arguments advanced by John Lucas.☜D3B8AB
□
John Searle
John Searle☜Arguments advanced by John Searle.☜D3B8AB
□
Joseph F. Rychlak
Joseph F. Rychlak☜Arguments advanced by Joseph F. Rychlak.☜D3B8AB
□
Keith Gunderson
Keith Gunderson☜Arguments advanced by Keith Gunderson.☜D3B8AB
□
L.J. Landau
L.J. Landau☜☜D3B8AB
□
Ned Block
Ned Block☜Arguments advanced by Ned Block.☜D3B8AB
□
Robert French
Robert French☜Arguments advanced by Robert French.☜D3B8AB
□
Roger Penrose
Roger Penrose☜Arguments advanced by Roger Penrose.☜D3B8AB
□
Selmer Bringsjord
Selmer Bringsjord☜Arguments advanced by Selmer Bringsjord.☜D3B8AB
□
Stephen Kosslyn
Stephen Kosslyn☜Arguments advanced by Stephen Kosslyn.☜D3B8AB
□
Zenon Pylyshyn
Zenon Pylyshyn☜Arguments advanced by Zenon Pylyshyn.☜D3B8AB
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Graph of this discussion
Graph of this discussion☜Click this to see the whole debate, excluding comments, in graphical form☜dcdcdc
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Entered by:-
David Price
NodeID:
#2784
Node type:
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Entry date (GMT):
7/20/2007 6:20:00 PM
Last edit date (GMT):
7/20/2007 6:20:00 PM
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