No: Test assumes representationalist theory of mind

By limiting itself to teletyped conversations, test assumes a representationalist theory of mind—ie thinking involves computational operations on symbolic representations. Assuming a representational system's capable of thinking begs the question.

Bennie Shanon, 1989.

Critics of the test have pointed out various thinking phenomena that cannot be accounted for by the representationalist framework.

See, for example, the "Can symbolic representations account for human thinking?" arguments on Map 3.
RELATED ARTICLESExplain
Artificial Intelligence
Can the Turing Test determine this? [2] 
No: Test assumes representationalist theory of mind
Turing Test makes an autonomy claim
Turing wasn't committed to representationalism
Can inductive evidence determine this?
No: passing the Test is not decisive
No: failing the Test is not decisive
No: but Neo-Turing test is adequate
Yes: human imitation is sufficient
No: simulated intelligence isn't real intelligence
No: existing AI programs have passed the test
No: Turing assumes the brain's a machine
Yes: defines intelligence operationally/behaviorally
No: ESP would confound the test
Turing Test misleads AI research
The Loebner Prize
Graph of this discussion
Enter the title of your article


Enter a short (max 500 characters) summation of your article
Enter the main body of your article
Lock
+Comments (0)
+Citations (0)
+About
Enter comment

Select article text to quote
welcome text

First name   Last name 

Email

Skip