No: simulated intelligence isn't real intelligence

Just as simulated diamonds are not real diamonds, a machine that simulates intelligence to pass the Turing Test is not really intelligent. In general, a simulated X is not a real X.



Argument anticipated by Jack Copeland, 1993.

"This objection commences with the observation that a simulated X is not an X.  Simulated diamonds are not diamonds.  A simulated X is X-like, but is not the real McCoy.  Now, suppose a computer passes the Turing Test.  How could this possibly show that the computer thinks?  Success in the Test shows only that the computer has given a good simulation of a thinking thing" (Copeland, 1993, p. 46).

Source: Copeland, Jack (1993) Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical Introduction.  Oxford: Blackwell.
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