nonviolent strategy
data suggests that the prospects for freedom are significantly enhanced when the opposition does not itself use violence
In all there were 47 transitions in which there was no (or almost no) opposition violence. Before the transition, none were Free, 23 were Partly Free, and 24 were Not Free. Today, years after the transition, 31 are Free, 11 are Partly Free, and 5 are Not Free. The mean freedom rating in these 47 cases was 5.22 pre-transition and 2.53 years after the political opening. Then net improvement was 2.69, a very significant gain for freedom on the 1-to-7 freedom scale.
By contrast, in countries where the opposition employed violence, pre-transition, none were Free, 8 were Partly Free, and 12 were Not Free. Today, 4 are Free, 12 are Partly Free, and 4 are Not Free. As significantly, the mean freedom score of this cohort of countries improved 1.52 points years after the transition, compared to the 2.69-point improvement in the freedom score in all the cases where there was no opposition violence.
In all, the data showed there is more than a three (66 percent) to one chance (20 percent) chance that a country will attain high freedom post-transition where the opposition does not employ violent force.
We also wanted to test whether the results for freedom are better if the opposition does not itself use violence in cases of significant or high state violence and instead employs disciplined nonviolent civic resistance. Thus we looked at all the cases of transitions preceded by high or significant levels of violence. Of 32 countries where transitions were preceded by significant or high levels of violence, 20 cases were characterized by violent force emanating from both the state and segments of the opposition. Of these, pre-transition 8 were Partly Free and 12 were Not Free. Today, 4 (20 percent) are Free, 12 (60 percent) are Partly Free and 4 (20 percent) are Not Free. By contrast, we found 12 cases where significant or high levels of violence were mainly generated by the state (but where the opposition was nonviolent), pre-transition, 5 were Partly Free and 7 were Not Free. Years after the political opening, 7 (58 percent) are Free and 5 (42 percent) are Partly Free, while none are Not Free.
In the end, our data suggests that recourse to violent conflict in resisting oppression is significantly less likely to produce sustainable freedom, in contrast to nonviolent opposition, which even in the face of state repression, is far more likely to yield a democratic outcome.