Theorems show limitations of machine thought

Gödel’s theorem, and other mathematical theorems like it, reveal essential limitations on the project of making machines that think.

Note: This region covers those arguments that don't derive from Lucas or Penrose but still deal with Gödelian limitations; that is, with the limitations that Gödel’s theorem—and other similar theorems—impose on machine and/or human intelligence.
RELATED ARTICLESExplain
Artificial Intelligence
Are thinking computers mathematically possible? [7]
No: computers are limited by Gödel's theorems
Theorems show limitations of machine thought
Gödel's first theorem
Gödel's second theorem
Gödel's and Church's theorems are psychological laws
Machines can't understand language like humans
Mathematical thought can't be fully formalised
Mathematics is an essentially creative activity
The argument from Church's theorem
A human can't simultaneously beat all machines
Machines may eventually have mathematical intuition
Gödel shows machines can't be fully conscious
Argument from Gödel's theorem is dialectical
Mathematical insight is non-algorithmic
Improved machines
Gödel limits formal systems not machine implementations
The problem of consistency
Lucas may be a Turing machine
Lucas tricks machines into contradicting themselves
Some people cannot understand Gödel's theorem
Graph of this discussion
Enter the title of your article


Enter a short (max 500 characters) summation of your article
Enter the main body of your article
Lock
+Comments (0)
+Citations (0)
+About
Enter comment

Select article text to quote
welcome text

First name   Last name 

Email

Skip