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There are overriding reasons to regard minds as consistent

Hutton's argument for the inconsistency of mind is flawed (see detailed text).

  • Hutton's probabilistic model of the mind is unrealistic. It holds that we accept or reject propositions independently of each other. This is not so.
  • An inconsistent model of the mind would affirm every proposition, but no mind would do that.
  • We must assume that we are consistent reasoners to be able to start reasoning at all.
John Lucas (1976).
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There are overriding reasons to regard minds as consistent
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