Belief in one's own consistency leads to inconsistency

Hutton argues that as humans may be inconsistent, we can’t be sure that the Gödel’s theorem can be applied to minds (see detailed text).

1) Probabililstic evidence suggests we have some contradictory beliefs.

2) Rationality demands we take probabilistic evidence seriously.

3) So, rationality demands we think there's some probability we're inconsistent.

4) So, being certain about one's own consistency—as Lucas claims we can be—is inconsistent with rationality.

Anthony Hutton (1976).
RELATED ARTICLESExplain
Artificial Intelligence
Are thinking computers mathematically possible? [7]
No: computers are limited by Gödel's theorems
The problem of consistency
Belief in one's own consistency leads to inconsistency
There are overriding reasons to regard minds as consistent
Gödel’s theorems don't apply to inconsistent machines
Inconsistency without explosion of belief
The mechanist's dilemma
We don't know that mathematics is consistent
Graph of this discussion
Enter the title of your article


Enter a short (max 500 characters) summation of your article
Enter the main body of your article
Lock
+Comments (0)
+Citations (0)
+About
Enter comment

Select article text to quote
welcome text

First name   Last name 

Email

Skip