Lucas claims less than Wang's dilemma suggests

Only those machines we know to be consistent are adequate candidates for models of the mind—and we can often tell this. Mechanists don't need to know the consistency of all machines, just that the ones presented to the mentalist are consistent.

John Lucas (1997).
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Lucas claims less than Wang's dilemma suggests
John Lucas
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