Highly complex machine may not be Gödelizable

A qualitative difference in the way computers think may be introduced when they have advanced to a high enough degree of complexity. Such a highly complex machine may recognise the truth of its own Gödel sentence.

Argument anticipated by John Lucas (1961).
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