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Consciousness before concepts

Thinking of an object conceptually—ie as falling under some category—presupposes consciousness of that object. Thus, attempts by logicians to account for the notion of conceptual thought with propositional functions presupposes consciousness.

...and especially thematization or focusing within consciousness.

Aron Gurwitsch (1959).
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