Adding causal inputs doesn't create consciousness
Imagine that the input to Maudlin's water computer machine comes from the external world by way of a Norwegian with a watering hose. It seems unlikely that the Norwegians input could make the otherwise unconscious machine conscious.
Selmer Bringsjord (1992).
Suppose Maudlin's consciousness computing machine were the size of Gigantor (-> ?) and input from the external world comes by way of a Norwegian with a watering hose. The addition of the Norwegian's input cannot make the otherwise unconscious machine conscious.
The Bringsjord argument
Bringsjord counters with:
"I still think Maudlin's argument survives, but for reasons he may find unpalatable... Let's suppose that the scale of [Maudlin's machine] has been changed considerably—so that [it] is also laid out across an expanse as large as the state of Texas... Let's suppose, furthermore, that the Norwegians are going to handle things ...Yet another Norwegian... walks by each trough, ... and they're going to follow watering instructions that represent programs. The large scale that we've now adopted makes scrutinizing this trio of machines easy. Imagine walking through their constituents while traveling through and over the American Southwest. (Texas alone will no longer suffice. We need Arizona and New Mexico for our trio.) .... [The machines]'s input is in a rather constant state of flux, because in addition to a Norwegian in charge of following watering instructions in relation to what she finds in a trough, there will be another Norwegian with a hose bringing in "input" from the external environment. ... Are we really to believe that [the] sensor Norwegian makes all the difference in the world? ... Isn't this rather hard to swallow?" (S. Bringsjord, 1992, pp. 229-30).
References
Bringsjord, Selmer. 1992. What Robots Can and Can't Be. Boston: Kluwer.